55-94 ORDINANCE NO. 55-94
AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF
DELRAY BEACH, FLORIDA, AMENDING CHAPTER 100,
"NUISANCES", OF THE CODE OF ORDINANCES OF THE CITY
OF DELRAY BEACH, FLORIDA, BY AMENDING SECTION
100.01, "EXISTENCE OF WEEDS, TRASH, AND VEGETATION
UPON LANDS PROHIBITED" TO PROVIDE FOR THE
PROHIBITION OF THE PLACEMENT OF PYRAMID-SHAPED
MARKERS OR OTHER SIMILAR TYPE MARKER WITHIN A PUBLIC
RIGHT-OF-WAY; PROVIDING A GENERAL REPEALER CLAUSE, A
SAVING CLAUSE, AND AN EFFECTIVE DATE.
WHEREAS, the City Commission of the City of Delray Beach,
Florida, desires to protect the safety of its residents and citizens
by prohibiting the placement of pyramid-shaped markers in the public
right-of-way.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COMMISSION OF
THE CITY OF DELRAY BEACH, FLORIDA, AS FOLLOWS:
~ That Chapter 100, "Nuisances", Section 100.01,
"Existence of Weeds, Trash, and Vegetation Upon Lands Prohibited", of
the Code of Ordinances of the City of Delray Beach, Florida, be, and
the same is hereby amended by adding subsection 100.01(E) to read as
follows:
/~ Dome-shaDed decorative markers, also known
as button markers, may be placed in the public
right-of-way, provided that s~h markers are no
laraer than six ¢6) inches in heiaht, have rounded
surfaces and no straight ed=es, and are separated bv
a minimum of two ¢2) feet. The property owner shall
assume all risk of liability for such markers. The
placement of pyramid-shaped markers or any other
similar type marker within a public right-of-way is
prohibited.
~_~ That all ordinances or parts of ordinances in
conflict herewith be, and the same are hereby repealed.
~_~ That should any section or provision of this
ordinance or any portion thereof, any paragraph, sentence, or word be
declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such
decision shall not affect the validity of the remainder hereof as a
whole or part thereof other than the part declared to be invalid.
~ That this ordinance shall become effective six
(6) months from its passage on second and final reading.
PASSED AND ADOPTED in regular session on second and final
reading on this the 5th day of July , 1994.
ATTEST:
JCity Cl~rk t
First Reading June 21, 1994
Second Reading July 5, 1994
- 2 - Ord. No. 55-94
MEMORANDUM
TO: MAYOR AND CITY COMMISSIONERS
FROM: CITY MANAGER~4~
SUBJECT: AGENDA ITEM ~ /O ~ - MEETING OF JULY 5. 1994
SECOND READING AND PUBLIC HEARING FOR ORDINANCE NO.
55-94/PYRAMID-SHAPED MARKERS
DATE: JUNE 28, 1994
This is second reading and public hearing for Ordinance No. 55-94
dealing with pyramid-shaped markers. This amendment to the
City's Code prohibits pyramid-shaped or similar type markers
within a public right-of-way and outlines specifications for the
use of dome-shaped markers.
The ordinance is proposed in response to direction from the City
Commission at the May 10, 1994, workshop meeting. It will become
effective six (6) months from its passage on second and final
reading.
Ordinance No. 55-94 was passed on first reading on June 21, 1994,
by unanimous vote of the Commission.
Recommend approval of Ordinance No. 55-94 on second and final
reading.
ref:a:agmemo6
30 June 1994
Delray Beach City Commission CITYCOMMISS!O~
Delray Beach,FL
Dear Commissioners:
I have been employed in the City of Delray Beach for the past four years
and am a homeowner, though I reside in Pompano Beach.
I am against the proposed ban against pyramid-shaped driveway markers for
the following reasons:
1. I believe the homeowner has a constitutional right to protect, decorate
and enhance his or her property or adjacent right-of-way entrusted to
the homeowner's care, as he or she sees fit. This is within the bounds
of present zoning or other ordinances, of course, and barring the use
of items with obviously injurious intentions, such as bayonets or land
mines.
2. I submit that rounded driveway buttons (which are OK under the proposed
ordinance), as well as mailboxes, most landscaping, railroad ties,
rocks, stop signs, streetlights, etc. pose just as much a potential
danger as do pyramid markers. Is the commission prepared to consider a
ban on all these items as well?
3o The heart of this matter, I think, is not really "Public safety" as is
claimed but rather the avoidance of potential lawsuits. When will those
proposing an overly restrictive ordinance such as this realize that we
cannot create a "risk-free" environment? Life by nature poses certain
risks; those unwilling to accept reality should consider staying inside.
4. Simply because certain individuals believe an action is a good-idea
does not necessarily constitute justification for making it law. Enact-
ment of this particular ordinance, unnecessary and solving nothing,
would be another prime example of "government-out-of-control"
For the record, I personally have 15 pyramid markers spread across 190 feet
of property and right-of-way on a corner lot. There have been no accidents
nor have I received any complaints since installing them; it appears vehicles
and pedestrians alike respect and consequently avoid this area.
Please reject this proposed ordinance. Thank you for your time.
Sincerely, '' ~CE~VE~ -
Bruce Frendahl C~YCLEPK
1~60 NE 32 Street L
Pompano ~ Beach, FL 33064
305/786-0062 home
407/278-1388 office
CITY (IF I)ELAIW BEA£H
CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE ~oo ~w
FACSIMILE 407/278-4755 Writer's Direct Line
(407) 243-7091
DATE: May 12, 1994 ~~ ~9~
we: City Co~ission
FROM: Susan A. Rubr, City Attorney
SUBJECT: Dome-Shaped ~arkers Ordinance
Attached please find the ordinance dealing with dome-shaped
markers. We have changed Section 4 which establishes the
effective date shall be six months from the passage of the
ordinance on second and final reading.
By copy of this memorandum to David Harden, City Manager, our
office requests that this ordinance be placed on an upcoming
sion agenda.
cc: David Harden, City Manager
Alison MacGregor Harty, City Clerk
Attachment
Printed on Recycled Paper
i ]TY JIF OELRR¥ BEFI[H
MEMORANDUM
DATE: April 12, 1994
TO: David T. Harden, City Manager
FROM: Susan A. Ruby, City Attorney
SUBJECT: Markers in the Riqht of Way
Attached is a copy of a proposed ordinance amending Sec. 100.01
by adding paragraph (E) which allows dome markers and prohibits
the placement of pyramid-shaped markers in the public
right-of-way.
Landowners are liable for allowing obstructions in the public
right of way. Morales v. Costa, 427 So.2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA
1983). This same duty does not apply to a landowner for
liability and damages caused by subterranean roots growing into
the right of way which could not readily be rectified by the
landowner. Sullivan v. Silver Palm Properties, 558 So.2d 409
(Fla. 1990).
The most conservative legal opinion to ensure protection
against liability for the City would be to not allow any
markers of any kind in the right of way. However, dome markers
are sometimes helpful to maintain the appearance of right of
ways. Therefore, if the policy of preserving the aesthetics of
rights of way is pressing, the attached ordinance seeks to
minimize unsafe conditions (by allowing dome markers only) and
enhance aesthetics.
The proposed ordinance clearly places the decision to place any
such marker on the landowner who pursuant to our ordinances has
the duty to maintain the contiguous swale areas. The ordinance
makes clear that the landowner assumes liability for the
placement of the markers in the rights of way. I believe this
will ensure some measure of protection for the City.
Attached are the cited cases and the proposed ordinance.
~sc~all if you have any questions.
. ~': ~ MORALES v. COSTA Fla. 297
Cite as, 427 So~ld 297 (Flu. App. 3 Dist. I
distance tray- the County correctly points out, there is
s ....' nothing inherently offensive about giving Antonio B. MORALES and Maria
County Public ~ its police officers the choice of retaining the Morales, Appeilanta,
6, Part I, sub- statutory witness fee or accepting greater v.
;o. 4-15, Stun- overtime compensation for off-duty court
!hereafter. the appearances. Carlos COSTA and Mary Costa, Security
Mutual Casualty Company, City of Mi-
The officers argue, however, that an ami, and County of Dude, Appellees.
opinion of the Attorney General, Op. Atty.
I to the daily Gen. 077-108, October 18, 1977, which states No. 81-2542.
fulfilled on that a city "may not require that officers District Court of Appeal of Florida,
:itness fee is remit their witness fees to the city in return Third District.
msatory time for overtime pay received," supports their
position. Even were we to accord the opin- Feb. 22, 1983.
satory time is ion great weight in construing the law of
ill deliver the this State, State Dept. of Citrus v. Office o£ Action was instituted by persons in-
Metropolitan '~ the Comptroller, 416 So.2d 820 (Fla. 2d DCA jured in an interjectional automobile acci-
aess Manage- ~,~ 1982); Richey v. Town of Indian River dent against persons who owned land adja-
.~eceipt." Shores, 337 So.2d 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); cent to the intersection. The Circuit Court,
~ the Rule did Beverly v. Division of Beverage of Dept. of Dude County, Edward S. Klein, J., entered
ellants of any Business Regulation, 282 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1st summary final judgment in favor of land-
,ns 92.141 and DCA 1973), we think that the further lan- owners, and the plaintiffs appealed. The
~m this ad- guage in the opinion that "there is no prohi- District Court of Appeal, Nesbitt, J., held
bition
against
[the
City]
paying
an
amount
that landowner may be held liable in negli-
ppeal. ~ over and above the witness pay calculated gence action for obstructions to the public
':he Rule pro-
... as the difference between the witness right-of-way.
.' Department fee and the amount that would be received
~e officers of Reversed and remandecL
~1 and 92.142, at time-and-a-half the normal salary paid'_'
~ng-that the _ undercuts the officers' position. As the
~tute answers County notes, the option it has provided by Automobiles ~=,289Landowner may he held liable in
""--Rule does not require the return of witness negli-"~
)ffieers pezed fees and, if the officers choose the overtime gence action for obstructions to the publi
y relief.: As c~
pay, the option is the functional equivalent right-of-way.
,); state ex ret of paying them the difference between the
kS, 160 So. 522 witne~ fee and the amount that would be
covery~y during°f mort-past '~ received at the overtime rate. Joe N. Unger, Ronald C. Kopplow, Miami,
:et up a binding i A~firmed. for appellants.
We merefore '~ Blackweil, Walker, Gray, Powem, Flick &
igme~t, insofar
otherwise sup- '~ Hoehi and Diane H. Tutt, Miami, for appel-
~ lees.
: trial court nor Before NESBITT, BASKIN and FERGU-
I with the ques- ~;! SON, JJ.
n dexogntton of
their collective
;ounty; wheth- ~ NESBITT, Judge-
the agreement The plaintiffs were injured in
I by the very ~ tional automobile
ethe~, in such
,cement (which ~, this action against, tl~
nS o/new con- land adjacent to the interaction. The corn-
by the County
~ideration sub- thee matters/n the briefs on appeal, but nei- decide them.
~l~ accoded ~o r · ~. thee the trial court no~ we were called upon to
298 Fla. 427 SOUTllERN REPORTER. 2d SERIES
plaint alleged that the Costas obstructed & Brid~es § 118 (1981}; see Gulf Re£inin~
the plaintiff's view of a stop sign by: (a) Co. r. Gilmore, 112 Fla. 366, 152 So. 621
planting a black olive tree in the swale (1934) (plaintiff recovered a jud~zment
ai'ea; and (b) voluntarily assuming the duty against defendant for injuries reccive, i
of the maintenance of that area and negli- when she tripped over a dark cord placc, t
gently failing to fulfill that obligation. The across a grass plot ~twcen ~hc curb and
trial court entered summary final judgment the paved sidewalk); see also Price
in favor of the landowners, ostensibly be- Parks, 127 Fla. 744, 173 So. 903 11937~.
cause it found that the landowner owed no Because we find, contrary to the trial
duty to a passing motorist for the obstrue- court, that a landowner may be liable for
tion of a public right-of-way. We reverse, obstructions to the public right-of-way, we
The defendant attempts to support the reverse the summary judgment and remand
appealed judgment by relying upon Evans for further proceedings.
v. Southern Holding Corp., 391 So.2d 231 Reversed and remanded.
(Fla. 3d DIZA 1980), pet. [or review denied,
399 So.2d 1142 (Fla.1981). There, we held
that in the absence of legislation imposing a
duty, a landowner had no duty to maintain
his property in a condition so as to protect a
motofist using the adjacent highway from
other approaching motorists. In Pedigo r.
Smith, 395 8o.2d 615 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981),
the court, following Evans, supra, found Maria RUIZ. Appellant,
that a landowner had no duty to a motorist
V.
where a tree planted on private property
obscured a motorist's view of a stop sign.' Jose Manuel RUIZ and Lumbermens
These decisions, then, recognize that a land- Mutual Casualty Co., Appellees.
owner Ms a fight to use and enjoy his No. 82-428.
property in any manner he sees fit.
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
O~:{[h~ ~ ~ ~n obstruction of a Third District.
pubiic~.fi~f-w~y by an edji~ent laud-
o~nar, even by something which grows and Feb. 22, 1983.
exisWupon a priv&ta property, but which
p~ into and otmt2mJct8 the public
~y, }e Im entirely different mat- Mother, who was injured while a pas-
tee., The court, in Evans, specifically ex- senger in automobile assertedly negligently
eluded the situation where an obstruction driven by minor daughter, sued mother's
protruded onto public property. The users former husband for her injuries. The Cfr-
of a public fight-of-way have a right to cult Court, Dade County, Francis X. Knuck,
expect that it will not be unreasonably ob- J., granted husband's motion for summary
structed. In contrast, they have no such judgment, and appeal was taken. The Dis-
expectations with respect to lands that are trict Court of Appeal, Jorgenson, J., held
entirely within the purview of private own- that mother was not statutorily permitted
ership. Consequently, aprivate person may to recover from former husband where
incur liability for damages caused by an daughter's application for driver's license
obstruction upon a public wayx 39 Am. was signed by mother and not by the for-
Jur.2d K/ghw~y~, Streets & Bridgem §§ 3,59, mcr spouse.
361 (1968); 29 FlaJur.2d High~vay~, Streets Affirmed.
!. Althou~ the court, inlaedigov. S~i~,mupra, tree was located entirely on private property.
did not state it explicitly, we assume that the
SULLI~.?A~':V.~.SlL~E.I~..PALM,~ROPERTIES, INC. Fla. 409 CI~esSS8 So.~d 409 ~ 1990)
at bar. S~e STATE of Florida, Petitioner, .. fumed..~e~_:_trii!.~court's: gr~. ting~ of~Fin-
1 at 384. In v. ney's motion for~.postconviction relief and
its vacating of one of Pinney's convictions
~ spite of a Roy Kenneth FINNEY, Respondent. based on the retroactive application of Ca-
the subcon- -.~
prevent the ~::~- No. 74607. ra~zn ~. S~te, 515 So.2d 16! (Fla. 198~),
against the and HaH ~. Sta~, 517 $o~2d 6?8 (Fla. 1988).
~d. In fact, Supreme Court of Florida. Recently, however, we held that a defen-
he statutory March $, 1~90. dant whose convictions are fully adjudi*
mit the sub- cated and final may not obtain posteonvic-
irectly. The tion relief based on a claim of improper
mnot be uni- Defendant convicted of possession of conviction of multiple crimes arising from a
by inserting firearm and robbery with firearm moved single transaction. State v. Glenn, 558
)etween the for postconviction relief. The Circuit So.2d 4 (Fla. 1990). In reaching this conclu-
! contractor. Court, Dade County, Alfonso C. Sepe, J., sion we also held that Carawan should not
~e owner to granted relief. The District Court of Ap- be applied retroactively. Hall, which is
the subcon- peal, 550 So.2d 1141, affirmed. The Su- based on Carawan, is, like Carawan, an
~ould thwart preme Court, McDonald, J., held that case evolutionary refinement in the law. Witt
~. of the me- proscribing convictio~' of multiple crimes v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.), cert. denied,
; allowing a .~ arising from single transaction was not 449 U.S. 1067, 101 S.Ct. 796, 66 L.Ed.2d 612
ns. Even if /~ retroactively applicable through motion for (1980). As such, Hall should not be ap-
:lecision that postconviction relief, plied retroactively through a motion for
postconviction relief. Glenn; Love v.
~' shifted the Quashed.
~t to OBS, it ~ State, 559 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1990). There-
t OBS could Overton, J., concurred in result only. fore, we quash Finney and direct the dis-
yment. Be- trict court to reverse the trial court's order.
~d has been It is so ordered.
Courts
hing a lien
OBS clearly ~;, Case proscribing conviction of multiple EHRLICH, C~I., and SHAW,
the bond.~ ~, ~ crimes arising from single transaction was BARKET[', GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ.,
~ ' not retroactively applicable through motion
~inion under __ ~ ii for postconviction relief, concur.
mand to the ~ 'i ~ OVERTON, J., concurs in result only.
s to affirm ~.
~'} Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Janet
~ Reno, State Atty., and Penny H. Brill, Asst.
PON, '"-?I State Atty., Miami, for petitioner.
~nd Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender,
and Marti Rothenberg, Asst. Public De-
fender, Miami, for respondent. Mary Sharon SULLIVAN, Petitioner,
McDONALD, Justice. $ILYER PALI~ PROPEI~IES,
We review State v. ~'nney, $~0 So.2d INC.. R~pomlent.
11~1 (Fla. 8d DCA 1080), because of eerti- No. 741~0.
fled conflict with Harri, v. State, 520 So.2d
C~9 {Fla. 1st DCA), r,vie~ denied, 586 Supreme Gour~ of Florida.
Ic~:l to, and did 8o.~d 244 (Fla. 1988), and Love v. State, ~Sg M~'eh 8, 1~0~
~d. ,~A~,r- So.2d 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1088), aplrroved,
~o~ ~'ll Co., $$~ So.2d 198 (Fla. lO00). We have juri~die-,
:" tion pursuant to article V, section 3(bX4), Passenger brought suit against land-
Florida Constitution, and quash Finney. owner alleging that tree roots caused
410 Fla~ 558 SOUTHERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES
bumps in road which resulted in loss of bumps in the road were caused by roots
control of automobile. The Circuit Court, from Australian pine trees that extended
Dade County, Maria M. Korvick, J., found from the adjacent property owned by Silver
for passenger, and landowner appealed. Palm Properties. Inc. The trees had been
The District Court of Appeal, 541 So.2d planted fifty to seventy years earlier and
624, reversed and certified question of before Silver Palm acquired the property.
great public importance. The Supreme Dade County stipulated that it owned the
Court, Barkett, J., held that landowner did road. that it had responsibility to maintain
not have duty to retard subterranean root and repair the r~ad. and that it had actua~
growth of trees located adjacent to public knowledge of the root conditions before the
right-of-way, accident. Sullivan sued Silver Palm. the
Certified question answered; decision driver of the automobile, and Dude County.
approved, for negligence. The jury found that all
three defendants were negligent and fixed
Automobiles ~:~289 a percentage of liability against each.
Landowner did not have duty to retard The issue here is limited to the judgment
subterranean,root growth of trees located that held Silver Palm liable. The district
adjacent to public right-of-way, court reversed that judgment, holding that
Silver Palm was not liable because the
landowner o~ved ~o duty to retard the sub-
Joe N. Unger of the Law Offices of Joe terranean root growth of its trees. Silver
N. Unger, P.A., Miami, and Robert E. Palm Properties. l,c., 541 So.2d at 627.
Schack, P.A., Coral Gables, for petitioner. Sullivan argues that the law in Florida is
Michael J. Murphy of Gaebe, Murphy, otherwise, citing Price r. Parks, 127 Fla.
Mullen & Antonelli, Coral Gables, for re- 744, 173 So. !)03 (1937); GulfR~fining£o.
spondent, v. Gilmore. 112 Fla. 3(66. 152 So. 621 (1933);
Armas v. Metropolitan Dude County, 429
BARKEq'r, Judge. So.2d 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); and Morales
We have for review Silver Palm Proper- v. Costa, 427 So.2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA),
ti~, [ne. v. Sullivan, 541 So.2d 624 (Fla. review denied, 434 So.2d 886 (Fla. 1983).
3d DCA 1988), in which the district court We find Sullivan's reliance on these
certified the following question of great cases misplaced. Both Gulf and Price in-
public importance: volved artificial conditions created by otb-
Does a landowner have a duty to retard ers directly on the public rights-of-way and
the subterranean root growth of its trees not natura, lly growing vegetation on abut-
which are located adjacent to a public ting land. In Gulf, a gas statiofi owner
right of way? had cordoned off the swale area between
Id. at 628) We answer the question in the the curb and the sidewalk to discourage
negative under the circumstances present- pedestrian traffic across the newlv planted
ed and approve the decision of the district grass. The cord was on stakes, dark in
court, color, and not readily observable at night.
Sullivan was injured when she was a One night, the plaintiff tripped over the
passenger in a ear that ran off a rural, cord as she stepped across the grass, and
paved, two-lane public road and struck a the Court ruled that this artificial condition
tree. The collision occurred after the ch-iv- created by the station gave rise to liability.
er lost control due to a series of bumps in In Price, the Court held that an injured
the road surface. The road had been built plaintiff had a cause of action against a
and maintained z by Dude County and the tortfeasor who caused a dangerous condi-
1. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. 2. For example, the county had root-pruned the
Const. trees in 1974 when thc road was resurfaced and
widened.
FLORIDA PATIENT'S COMP. FUND v. SCHERER Fla. 411
tion by allowing materials from his vehicle walks. Those decisions refused to hold
caused by roots
~s that extended to fall onto the roadway. In that case, a landowners liable for injuries caused by
owned by Silver contractor spilled slippery materials and roots growing under the surface of a public
~ trees had been ~' substances from his truck onto a public right-of-way. City of Birmingham v.
ears earlier and :: bridge, causing the ensuing accident. Wood, 240 Ala. 138, 197 So. 885 (1940):
ed the property. Morales and Armas, on the other hand, Wall v. Village of Tallulah. 385 So.2d 905
:hat it owned the do involve natural conditions rather than (La. Ct. App.), writ refused, 393 So.2d 737
,ility to maintain artificially-created ones. In both eases, the (La.1980); Rose v. Slough, 92 N.J.L. 233.
,nat it had actual ' landowner was held responsible for the 104 A. 194 (1918); Bennett v. Gordon. 101
litions before the maintenance of trees or vegetation that N.J.Super. 252, 244 A.2d 135 lApp. Div.).
¢ilver Palm, the obstructed the motorist's view of a stop cert. denied. 52 N.J. 499, 246 A.2d 456
ad Dude County, sign. Like the district court, we see eonsid- (1968). We find the rationale in those
found that all erable difference between the duty imposed cases directly applicable:
. igent and fixed in Morales and Armas and the duty sought It was the responsibility of the municipal-
gainst each. to be imposed here. As the majority below ity, and not that of [the abutting proper-
noted: ty owner], to maintain the sidewalk and
to the judgment [C]ommon sense required that a duty be correct the defect. Because of the re-
lc. The district imposed upon the landowner to remove moteness of the relationship between the
ent, holding that
landscaping which obstructed critical tree owner, the growth of the tree rookq
)lc because the traffic signage. Vegetation that over- and the resulting defect in the sidewalk,
) retard the sub-
hangs and blocks out a traffic control it cannot be logically held that [the abut-
ts trees. Silver device constitutes an obvious condition ting property owner] actually "created or
~1 So.2d at 627.
and presents an imminent danger of un- caused the defect involved."
aw in Florida is
controlled traffic. The offending branch, Wall, 385 So.2d at 909 {citation omitted}.
Parks, 127 Fla. moreover, need only be clipped away, a We answer the certified question in this
,~lfRefining Co. straightforward remedy .... context in the negative and approve the
~2 So. 621 (1933);
~de County, 429 ... [!In the case now before us the decision of the district court.
3); and Morales offending vegetation was anything but It is so ordered.
obvious. The root growth was slow and
(Fla. 3d DCA),
886 (Fla.1983). subterranean; the defect in the right-of- EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON,
way became noticeable only after a con- McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES and
liance on these :: siderable passage of time .... All par- KOGAN, J J:, concur.
df and Price in- ties stipulated that Dude County, not Sil-
created by oth- ""'~ ver Palm, owned and maintained the t~..__..._.._....,
ights-of-way and roadway shoulder and surface in the area
.,'etation on abut- of the accident. SiDea, Palm had n~ fig'bt
,s station owner
le area between of the ro~dw~lr. T~ hold a landowner
.k to discourage liable for failing to clip back vegetation FLORIDA PATIENT'S COMPENSA-
~e newly planted that has overgrown a traffic control de- TION FUND, et al.,
stakes, dark in ~ vice is reasonable. To impose upon a Petitioners/Cross-Respondents,
· .rvable at night. .~ landowner a duty to undertake root v.
ripped over the
~ the grass, and ~ trenching or tree topping purely in antici- Clara M. SCHERER,
ctificial condition : pation that subterranean growth may al- Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.
e rise to liability. ~ ter the surface of a public right-of-way
t at some indeterminate time in the future No. 72878.
I that an injured is both burdensome and unreasonable. Supreme Court of Florida.
action against a ! Silver Palm Properties, 541 So.2d at 626-
dangerous condi- t 27. March 8, 1990.
~ad root-pruned the
was rcsurfaced and I Florida, other jurisdictions have considered Patient brought medical malpractice
this issue in the context of public side- action against physicians, hospital, and Pa-
t=I&.C~ 557-558 So.2c}---I 8
su/t by bill of Bernice ~. Sh~m~hafl~kept the pohcy in: e~.~o~ ag.ainst~ ~qontractor shown to have
~/mants praying force for several years after it was given' occaaioned dangeroui condition by allowing
:rplead and that to her ~vith her own earnings, openly re- materials from his'~vehlcIes to fall and neg-
~ of the policy ] sisted all effort on the part of Shannahan ligenfly to accumulat~ on highway or bridge.
'.plainant be d/s- i to recover it, always contended that the even though contractor has assumed no duty
~ty in respect to ~ policy was hers and consistently support- to maintain or keep highway or bridge in
ed her right-to retain possession of it. repair.
Th~ record reveals nothing to show an
their right to
a decree of in- inconsistent position on her part, whiIe as Error to Circuit Court, Monroe Coun-
:ich was ~lOlle. to Shannahan, it is shown that he repeat- ty; Jefferson B. Browne, Judge.
aim to thc pro- edly took different and inconsistent posi-
~ each claim, a tions for the purpose of recovering the Action by George G. Parks agaiust .l.
verse claimant, policy. Price, individually:and as owner of ti~e Okee-
chobee Construction Company. To review
n hnal hearing- [i] The authorities generally sustain a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings
:rnice S, Shun- the doctrine that a life insurance policy error.
,rocccds of the may be the subject o£ a parol gift. Gar-
~gly. This al>- ncr v. Bcmis, 81 Fla. 60, 87 So. 426; Mc- Affirmed.
Donald v. McDonald, 215 Alu. 179, 110 W. Curry Harris and William V. Albury,
'id Shannaban, So. 291; 12 R.C.L. 9.4.3; 37 C.~. 429. both of Key West, and Waller & .',lcgin-
' the chancellor [2] By the issues and the facts proven, niss, of Tallahassee, for plaintiff in error.
e the right to the chancellor could have in right and Arthur Gomez, Aquilino Lopez, .Ir., a~d
eserved in the justice reached no other conclusion than Thomas S. Cato, all of Key West, for dc-
de repeated at- to axvard the proceeds of the policy to fendant in error.
ficiary but was the appellee; so his judgment must be~
~ appellee Bet- and is hereby, affirmed. PER CURIAM.
.s in lSOSScSsion Affirmed. -~' This was an action bronght in the circuit
to surrender it court o£ Monroe county by George G. Parks,
ELLIS, C. J'., and BUFORD, j'., concur, whereby plaintiff sought to recover from
, appellee con- .[. E. Price, individually, and as owner
'.annahan made WHITFIELD, P. J., and' BROWN.and the Okeechobee Construction Company,
' to her before DAVIS, .]'J., concur in the opinion'-and certain injuries anddamagesalleged to have
he policy was judgment, been sustained by the said Parks as the re-
,eld by her at sult of an automobile accident on a detour
e insurcd, who ~ bridge extending between Stock Island and
~ in her posses- ~ the Island of Key West, in Monroe county,
r own earnings '"'~'~ as a remit, so it was alleged in the declara-
d in effect for tion, of the negligence of the defendants,
elivered to her. who were using said detour bridge in con-
stion of owner- ~1~(1£ v. '[~&~g$. .... nec/ion with their work for the State Road
Department, in: allowing certain slippery
in issue, and Supreme Court of Florida, Division B. materials and substances being hauled by.
aterial respccts . Apr:il 21, 19a7. them over said detour bridge to so accumu-
zubstantial evi~ late thereon as to make said bridge danger-
; of the chun- I. AutomoMles
t contradiction Person who causes defect or obst~,uctlon ous to persons whom the defendants knew,
or ought to have known, were likely to be
ahan took out in traveled public war, including detour injured by said dangerous condition. The
protection of bridge kel~ Ol~m for public use, is llabl~
and two small to motori~ for injuries caused thereby, declaration was upheld as against demur-
the premiums wher~ defect was occasioned by such per~ ret, and upon trial a recovery for $2,000
~ he was con- son's affirmatl?~ act or positive neglect, and damages and costs was sustained by the trial
judge, whose judgment to that effect comes
rt Myers and mowrist does nol; lose his right to recov- here on writ of error.
id Shannahan; er becaust of his own fault, even though no
ed to abandon general duty o~ maintsnanc~ has been aa- [1] A person causing a defect or ob-
before doing sumed by such person or exists on his part. strucfion in a traveled public way, including
d told her that a detour bridge kept open for public use, is
it; that she 2. Bridges ~::~3~ liable in damages to an injured automobilist
with it; and Hiobways ~=~200 for injuries caused by such defects or
~ecame of her Right of action of person harmed by struction, where the defect or obstruction
married Cath- '!i dangerous eoudltian of highway or public was occasioned by the affirmative act or
died in 1935. ? bridge k~,p! -pen for public .travel may be positive neglect of the defendant, and pla/n-
904~ Fla. 173 SOUTHERN REPORTER
tiff has not lost his right to recover because the year~ designated (Acta 1935, e.
of his own fault in the premises, even though § 9).
no general duty of m. aintenance has been 3. Statutes ~:::~12l(61/2)
assumed by defendant, or exists on his part. Provision of statute prohibiting sale by
[2] If harm is caused by thc dangerous State ,)f tax sale certificates covering eer-
conditiou of a highway or public bridge tain years, until a day certain, except on
" held open for public travel, the right of written application of owner, held to come
action of tl:e person t;armcd may be eh- within pu;'view of title of net which
forced a~ainst h contractor sh,)wn to have vhk, d fur "the compromise and adjustlnent
occasioned a dangerous couciition of sa~d ,~f tax sale certificates held by state ~:pon
highway or brid~e by allowinj materials ct, rt:tin conditions" (Acts 1935, c. 17406, ~ 9).
from his vehicles to fall and ncgligc;~tly to
accumulate on same, even though such con- 4. Constitutional law
tractor has assumed no duty to maintain or P u'ty s~qdng adjudication of courts on
keel) thc hizlm':ty or brklge in repair, the constitutiomdity of a statute must show
An application of thc foregoing rule of that his constitutional rights have b~n abro-
law to the plcadi~gs and cvidcncc requires gated or are threatened by the acL
an atfirmancc u~,ti~e judgment, and it is so 5. Constitutional law ~42
ordered. Varty chaltengiug constitutionality o~
Affirmed. statute prohibiting sale of tax sale c~rtlfi-
coles by State, until a day certain, held with-
Wtl[TFiY'~LD. P. y n:;d ElxO~ N and ,mr stamling to maintain sui~ wlm~ he was
DAVIS, JJ., c~.t~cur, only n p,'oSl~ective purchaser of a certllicate
ELLIS, C. J., ;md 'FERRELL and BU- wilh no present interest In the
FORD, JJ., concur m tim opinion aud judg- nov in the land upon whteh It wa~ ~ 11~
ami was not diseriminnted ngainat, and
ment. ute applied similarly to ~1 liR~ situat~
(Acts 19~, e. 174~, {
~ Appeal a.d error ~1138
In mandamu8 pr~din~ to ~m~l sale
of ~ax sale certificate by S~ conCra~
6cRCuce prohibiting such sale until a day ~r-
rain exccpC on written application of o~er,
-~ constitutionality of which' was challen~
STATE ex ~L P~INGLE v. DYKES, Cl~rg by petitioner, p~stng of day designated
of CouP. statute while ca~ was ~ndlng so statute no
longer applied to tax sale ~rtlflcates
Supreme ~un of Florida, Division ~ to make issue rai~ by p~dings m~t
April 12, 1937. IActs 19~, ~. 174~, [ 9; ~mp. Gem~
Supp. ~ 992).
I. Taxation ~679(5)
~linquen~ tax ce~ificates In the hands DAVIS, J., dls~ntlng in pa~
of the State a~ subject to legislative dis- ~_
position, provid~ such dis~sitiou d~s not
violat~ due pr~mss, ~ual protection, or uni- Appeal from Circuit CouP, ~ke Coun-
form taxation clauses of ~nstitutiom ty; J. C. B. Koonce, Judge.
Application for alternative writ of man-
2. Constitutional law ~229(3), 285 damus hy the State, on rdation o~ H. L.
Taxation ~615
Pringle, against Geo. ~. Dykes, as Clerk
Provision of statute prohibiting sale of of the Circuit ~urt for ~ke County.
tax ~le ~rtificates covering designated .[udgmcnt quashing and dismissing
years held by State, until a day certain, ex- writ, and plaintiff brings error.
~pt on writ~n application of owner, hcld
A~rmed.
not violative of the due process, equal pro-
t~tlon, or uniform taxation clauses of ~n- H.L. Pringle, of Leesbu~, for plaintiff
stitution, since purpose and effect was not in error.
to relieve owner oi any pa~ of tax, in- J. Xv. Hunter, Dun~n, Hamlin & Dun-
torest, or ~nalty, but merely to extend ~ can, and John S. Lavi~ ~ of Tavares, for
tied of redemption from lien for taxes for de~endant in error.
GULF RE~IKfNO CO. v. Gr~.~ORE ~,~t~. 621
GUes J. P~
' ~ BISCAYNE TRUST COMPAq, a Co~- ~ ~
~, Appeli~ : ~' ~yne Trust ~mpany, Bank of Bay Biscayna, ~e, for d~nt ~ ~r.
~d~ a Corporation, and M. A. Smith, as Liquida- P~
. tot of said Bank of Bay Bis~yne, Appellant,
; .> T~ ca~e ha~g he~tofore
~. Geo~ T. O'FA~HK~ A~elle~. ~ed to the ~urt upon ~he tr~ript
Johns ~u~ Supreme ~ourt of Florid~ r~rd of ~e Jud~ent h~in and b~s ~d
ar~en: of ~1 for ~e ~five par-
Jan. 27, 193~ firs, and ~e ~rd ~vmg b~ s~n and
stine, for a~ ~ s~.~d, and ~e court ~i~ now advis~ of
~ En. Banc. i~ jud~ent to be given in the premise~ It
for ap~. Appeal from Circuit ~urt, Dada ~unty;
s~ms to ~e court ~at ~ere
~ Worth W. Trammell, Judge. the mqid judb~enL It is ~e~ore cansider.
) Mitchell D. Price and Charles W. Zaring, ed, ordered, ;md adjudg~ by ~e c~ur~
~un~ f~ ~ both of Miami, for apl~llants, the ~id ju(l~ent of the circuit ~u~ b~ ~md
; ~thVincentof Miami, C' Giblinfor apollo.and G~. ~. O'Fa~eH, the same is hereby, ~m~.
~ PER CURIAM. BI,OWN, ~d BUFORD, JJ., concur.
~ In this ca~ a mnJority.~f the ~u~ are
~ of the opinion that the order appealed from TEI~]~I~ ~, uot participa~
i fails withiu the purview of Thcrrcll v. Ilow-
i land (Fla.) 146 So. 203 (sixth headnote), and On Hchea~ng.
~., Ptalnt~s ~ that therefore it should ~ rever~ and r~
BX
A.
N.
nmnded GU au~ority of thc opinion in [hat PEI~ CUI~AM.
Error. case. Gu O~-tobcr 17, 19~, ~e Judgm~t horcin
]m llever~d alld ~manded. was allirmed by a per curiam d(~.iM,m with-
OHE opilliou. The case is now ~,for,, us for
DAVIS. C. J., and WHITFIELD. TER- ~onsideration u~n rehearing ~:mt~ and
RELL, and BUFOItD, JJ., concur, rearg~ent had the~m
~unty. Plaintiff ~low su~ ~r ~ injury sus~in-
~ pl~n~ in ' BROWN, J., disqu~ifi~ ~ by her wh~ she trip~ over a cord in the
~ :~ nighttime as she s~p~ up onto ~e c~rb
~:h' and s~r~ to wffik acr~ a gra~ pl~ l~at-
~,~-~ ed betw~n ~e curb ~d pav~ sidew~k at
~j'~:~ ~at ~iut. ~e pr~f showed that defend~
--=.: a corner flUlng stolon o~ra~r, had ~ver~
ion ~ ~uu- ~Jf: ~ days prior to plaintiff's injury dug up ~e
' space betw~n ~e curb and sid~alk for a
:: - GULF REFINING CO. v. GILMOR~ gra~ plo~ had plant~ it wi~ ~, and had
: ~ 17, 1~. ~ a dark brown mvrappipg ~rd, not readily
d~er~ble at night, on stak~ aro~d this
'" On Rehea~ng ~eb. 7, 1~ gr~s plot The pr~f
'~ ~M,i~al cut,rations ~808(2). cord, smq~nded ~ i[ was about six or eight
inca~ Irom ~e ~o~d around the gr:~
Evidence showed ~at ~rner filling ~- plot, and being dark ~lor~ ug~st a dark
as O. & L ' ~on o~mtor w~ negligent in leaving brown
back~ound, was hard W see, and ~at no
~o~ E. ~ on smk~ aro~d gra~ plot l~ated ~
twin curb and 8idewal~ causing ~/rian noti~, ligh~ or w~ning of
or placed a[ ~e s~t
lm to trip ower ~rd ~ nigh~m~ the cord's existence at ~at ~in~
We think the verdict was amply jus~fl~ by
~he evident, and is su~inable as a mater
~ror to ~t ~ur~ Duv~ ~uuty; W. of law on ~e following au~orities: ~ng v.
the motion. Action by N~n~ P. G~more, ~m~ri~ ~. 5~, 22 A. L. R. 1493; O~ycke r. ~blic
against ~e O~ Refining ~m~y. ~ ~ Se~l~ R. ~., 78 N. J. ~w, 570, 70 ~ 1~,
view a Ju~t ~ favor of plamMff, d~end- 2~ L. ~ A. (N. S.) 71; Dickey v.
~ for - - ~t briu~ e~on ~aph ~.. 46 Me. ~.
~rm~. In ~e prong c~ ~e g~t of ~e cau~ of
622 1~ " ~2 SOUTHEB~ REPORTER
ac~on sued f~r w~s ~e ~g b~ a ~ P~
~r~raflon of ~ o~on on a ~ of ~I ~i~ on motion of-~u~ f~
-.
thes~t~ ~ ~ea~of ~me~- ~ ~ve
i~ as ~ i~ p~e, was pr~med W be
fr~ of dan~rous pitfalls ~ch ~ ~rds and
~e l~e, s~etch~ ~ such manner ~ to ~ip ~
~estrians at~mp~ing ~ ~ from ~e ~rb
~ ~he sidew~k proof. In such ~es the lia-
bility o~ the ~riv~e ~n ~[ac~g ~e ~b- J~mes ~. ~OO~N. Junior, Ap~ell~at,
~Cru~on ~d failing ~ g~ve w~ing of ~ VAh FIN~NC~ CO. et ~1..
p~ i~ differcnC from ~he ~nb~i~y ~ ~be
Therefore ~e c~ rcli~ on by pin.tiff In June term, 19~.
error for reve~ are not h~ point, since ~hey
refer to ~e liability of a mmficipal cor~ra- Ap~al from Circuit ~u~ Dural
tion for ~j~ri~ r~cived by a ~de~rian D. ~ C~p~ll, of Jnck~nvlllc, for ap~.
wh~ ~sioned by ~e me~ pr~e in a
lan~
strut of ~ obs~ruc~on ~mt conceivably can
~ plac~ ~c under proof ~nditio~ Baker & Baker, of Jacksonville, for ap~.
l~s.
Re~m~ on rehear~g.
WHITFIELD, P. J~ ~d BROWN and BU- P~R C~IA~
FOI~D, JJ., concur.' Ap~al dismisS, on mo~on ~ ~un~
appcll~
DAVIS, C. J., and E~IS ~d ~RR~
JJ. concur ~ ~e opinion and j~d~ea~ · , -
MIAMI COCA CO~ BOTTLING CO., a C~.
~ poration, Plaintiff In Error, v. George
STRATTON, Defendant In Error.
Supreme ~u~ of ~()rid~
G.~* .. SIMONS *, .1., A,,ella.ts, .. J. ~ ~.ne term, 1~3.
GANT, A~ellee.
Supr~e ~u~ of ~orid~ ~mr to Circuit ~u~ Dade Count.
June ~m, 19~. Ku~ & R~ of Miami, for plain~ff
~O~. ,.
Ap~l from ~t Cou~ Saraso~ ~un- James ~f. Ca~on ~d Ro~ WllH~s,
~. of Miami, for defendant tn error.
Frank Redd, of Sa~sota, for ap~ll~ PER CURIA~
~ H. House, of Sara~, for ap~H~ Writ of error dis~, on mo~ of
P~ CUHIAM~ ~1 for the res~ve ~r~
Ap~al di~ on moron of ~ for
ap~ll~
Gus CHESHIRE. Plaintiff In Error. v. STATE
of Florida. Defenda,t In Error.
Fred P. MADISON et al., Appellants, v. C.E. Supreme Court (,f Fioridu.
MEES, Appellee. June term, 1933.
Supreme Court of Florida. Error to Circuit Court, Escambia Counl3'.
June term, 1933.
D. W. Berry, of Pensacola, for plaintiff in
error.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Sarasota Coun-
ty. Cary D. Landis, Att~. Gen., for the StaC~
Williams & Dart, o/ Sarasota, for alA~l- PER CURIAM~
lants. Writ of error dismissed on motion of
C. I.. McKaig, of Sara~oca, for appellee. Attorney General.
MEMORANDUM
TO: MAYOR AND CITY COMMISSIONERS
FROM: CITY MANAGER ~"{
SUBJECT: AGENDA ITEM # ;~ - MEETING QF JUNE 21. 1994
FIRST READING FOR ORDINANCE NO. 55-94/PYRAMID-SHAPED
MARKERS
DATE: JUNE 17, !994
This is first reading for Ordinance No. 55-94 dealing with
pyramid-shaped markers. This amendment to the City's Code
prohibits pyramid-shaped or similar type markers within a public
right-of-way and outlines specifications for the use of
dome-shaped markers.
The ordinance is proposed in response to direction from the City
Commission at the May 10, 1994, workshop meeting. It will become
effective six (6) months from its passage on second and final
reading.
Recommend approval of Ordinance No. 55-94 on first reading. If
passed, public hearing will be on July 5, 1994.
ref:a:agmemo6
,CITY OF DELRI V BErI£H
100 N.W. 1st AVENUE * DELRAY BEACH, FLORIDA 33444 · 407/243-7000
Ali. America City
TO: Susan Ruby, City Attorney
FROM: David T. Harden, City Manageri~i~'C'I
SUBJECT: MARKERS IN THE RIGHT-OF-WAY
DATE: March 21, 1994
We have been contacted several times by Florence Willett, a
resident of Boynton Beach, concerning the alleged dangers of
pyramid-shaped markers in the public right-of-way. At one
time, Mrs. Willett was involved in a bicycle accident where
she felt a pyramid marker caused her bicycle to overturn.
She has also expressed concern about the increased hazard of
someone falling on the point of a pyramid, as opposed to
other types of markers.
When Greg Luttrell was here, he had talked with Mrs. Willett
and proposed that we adopt an ordinance prohibiting pyramid
markers in the City. I asked him to provide me with some
studies or even anecdotal accounts which would indicate that
there was additional danger attached to these pyramid
markers. Greg never produced such information.
Recently, Mrs. Willett contacted us again on this issue. I
am attaching for your information an excerpt from the City
Code for the City of Hollywood, which addresses this matter.
Do you think a similar amendment to our City Code would be
advisable from a liability standpoint?
DTH:mld
Attachment
THE EFFORT ALWAY'.'-; MATTERS
BOYNTON BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT
EDWARD G, HILLERY, JR,
CODE ENFORCEMENT UNIT
100 E. BOYNTON BEACH BOULEVARD
BOYNTON BEACH, FLORIDA 33435
(407) 738-7482
FAX (407) 738-7459
April 30, 1992
Ms. Florence Willett
4325 Shelldrake Lane
Boynton Beach, Florida 33436
Dear Ms. Willett,
Enclosed please find a copy of our City Code, Section 22-4,
Obstructing streets, prohibited.
As per our telephone conversation of today, this code is used by
the City of Boynton Beach to regulate the placement of dangerous
obstacles in our City rights of way. Ou~r City Attorney has
deemed concrete pyramids to be considered a dang.erous object and
has advised us that they violate the above mentioned code
section.
If our office can be of any further assistance please contact me
at 738-7482 ext. 233.
Sincerely,
CITY OF BOYNTON BEACH
Scott Blasie
Code Enforcement Unit Supervisor
SB/smb
Attachment
c: Central Files
BOYNTON BEACH CODi~,
STREETS AND SIDEWALKS
Sec. 22-4. Obstructing streets, prohibited.
It shall be oniowful for any person or the agent or agents
of any such ~erson to-blockade or obstruct any street or
public way within the city, so as to impede traffic or
pedestrians thereon, .or ca,nse any interference__ or dangerous
obs~.ncl~.~ tn h~ plA~cl on or across any of t.h~ street~ or
public ways within the city. (Code 1958, § 25-3)
Cross reference--Railroads blocking crossings, § 14-7.
Sec. 22-5. Street improvements required before ac-
ceptance of dedicatio~
Before any plat or deed or inst~ment conveying or
dedicating any street right-of-way to the city sl~_~11 be
accepted by the city, all roads shall be paved so as to meet
the minimum requirements set forth in this chapter. (Code
1958, § 25-3.1)
Cross reference--Procedure for obtaining approval of subdivisions,
App. C, Art. VIII.
Secs. 22-6--22-15. Reserved.
ARTICLE II. CONSTRUCTION, REPAIR OR
ALTERATION*
Sec. 22-16. Permit required.
No person shall begin to construct, reconstruct, repair,
alter, or grade any sidewalk, curb, curb-cut, driveway or
street on the public streets without first obtaining a permit
from the city engineer as provided by this article. This
includes the construction of r. ew streets in proposed and
newly platted subdivisions. (Code 1958, § 25-5)
Sec. 22-17. Application required; contents.
An applicant for the permit required by section 22-16
hereunder shall file with the city engineer an'application
showing:
(a) Name and address of the owner, or agent in charge, of
the property abutting the proposed work area;
(b) Name and address of the party doing the work;
(c) Location of the work area;
(d) Attached plans, or sketch, showing details of the
proposed work;
(e) Estimated cost of the work;
(f) Such other information as the city engineer shall find
reasonably necessary to tLe determination of whether
a permit should issue hereunder. (Code 1958, § 25-6)
., § 17-13 E , §. 17-15
as required by the city engiS'eer. (Ord. No. 1615, § 1; Code 1963,
§ 38.13; Ord. No. 64-18, § 1; Ord. No. 0-71-34, 3-17-71)
Sec. 17-14. Fences, bushes or hedges.
All fences, bushes or hedges located within required setback
areas shall be limited to the following heights which shall be
measui'ed from finished grade which shall not be more than three
(3) feet above the nearest abutting street or alley:
(a) Side setback area-six (6) feet
(b) Rea'r setback area-six (6) feet
(c) Front setback area-four (4) feet
(d) 'Corner setback area-two (2) feet with an area lying adja-
cent to a street or alley and delineated by a line connecting
points measured twenty-five (25) feet distant along the prop-
erty lines from the intersection of' a street and six (6) feet
along the property lines at the intersecti6n of' an alley and
a street A chain link or other simiim'ly open fence may be
constructed ~o a l~e,,ght of four ,.i) feet within the corner
setback area when it is determined by the growth manage-
ment director or his designee that such height does not
constitute a visual barrier. (Code 1963, § 38.14; Ord. No.
O-66-15I, §§ 1, 2; Ord. No, 0-79-15, § 1 4-17-79; Ord. No.
0-79-?0, § 1, 12-19-79)
'i
See. i7-15. Obstruction of public right-of-way.
(a) Prohibited. The:'Placement and maintenance of shrubbery,
sprinkler systems, signs, tree trimmings, refuse,'py_ramid-shapFd
marl_,q2ji,e,,h,% and all other articles within a public ri~IM;-oLway is
prohibited. .
(b) ~ns. D_o~ne-sh.aped decorative markers,, also known
as button markers, may be placed in the public right-of-way, pro-
vided that such markers are no larj{e~ than. six (_61 inches in height,
have rounded surf`aces and no straigh~ edges, and are separated
]! bY a mi~im~m °f tw° (2) £eet- Tt~e P~'°perty°wner shallassume all
risk of liability for such marlders."----in ad'diJ;ion, one ('1) sign id'~--
tif~"ng a b{lsin'~ss establisl~men~ may be located within the public
Supp. No. 95 1320
17-15 LAND IMPROVEMENT CODE § 17-17
right-of-way adjacent to such establishment when the city com-
mission following review of a recommendation from the growth
management director determines that the following conditions
exist:
(1) That the ability to properly identify the business establish-
ment is substantially reduced by trees, traffic-control de-
vices or other public improyements installed in the public
right-of-way.
(2) That such sign is sized and located so as not to reduce the
visibility of traffic, traffic-cOntrol devices, or other business
establishments and does r~ot restrict unduly the use of a
public sidewalk.
That a hold harmless agreement satisfactory to the city "~
attorney be provided releasing the city responsibility
injury resulting from such' sign. '
(4) The use of such sign shall be allowed only for so long as the
above three (3) conditions e~st, and if the city commission
determines that any of the .three (3) conditions do not exist,
it shall order such sign removed forthwith. (Ord. No. 1615,
§ '13; Code 1983, § 28.15; Ord. No. 0-79-59, § 1, 10-17-79;
Ord. No. 0'80-41, § 1, 7-16-80; Ord. No. 0-90-11, § 1, 2-21-90)
Sec. 1'7-16. Reserved.
Editor's note-Ord. No. O-75-39, § 1 enacted March 19, 1975, amended this
Code by repealing § 17-16, relating to sidewalks and curbs, in its entirety. Former
§ 17-16 was derived from Ord. 1615, § 14; Ord. 1944, § 2; Code 1963, § 38.16; Ord.
65-6, § 1; Ord. No. O-69-113, § 1.
Sec. 17-17. Streets.
(1) The arrangement, character, extent, width, grade and loca-
tion of ail streets shall conform to the design and construction
standards following section 17-3 and shall be determined by con-
sidering their relationship to existing and planned s~ree~s, to ser-
vice, convenience and safety and in their appropriate relationship
to the proposed uses of the land to be served by such streets.
(2) All applicants for permits', for street improvements must
notify the engineering department twenty-four (24) hours in ad-
Supp. No. 95 1320.1