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Agenda Special 08-12-03
DFLRAY BEACH CITY COMMISSION CITY OF DELRAY BEACH, FLORIDA WORKSHOP - TUESDAY. AUGUST 12. 2003 6:00 P.M. FIRST FLOOR CONFERENCE ROOM 1993 2001 The City will furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford an individual with a disability an equal oppommity to participate in and enjoy the benefits of a service, program, or activity conducted by the City. Contact Doug Randolph at 243-7127, 24 hours prior to the program or activity in order for the City to reasonably accommodate your request. Adaptive listening devices are available for meetings in the Commission Chambers. WORK~HOP A GE~A 1. Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) Proposal to purchase Judge Knott House 2. Proposed Police and Fire Pension/Benefit Changes 3. Proposed Reclaimed Water System 4. Parks and Recreation Bond Issue Referendum Schedule 5. Sponsorship for 2004 Florida Trust Annual Conference 6. Commission Comments Please be advised that if a person decides to appeal any decision made by the City Commission with respect to any matter considered at this meeting, such person will need to ensure that a verbatim record includes the testimony and evidence upon which the appeal is based. The City neither provides nor prepares such record. Via email (letter only) and U.S. Mail (with attachments) July 22, 2003 Dr. Janet Snyder Matthews Director Division of Historical Resources 500 S. Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 RE: Judge Knott Building, 20 N. Swinton Avenue, Delray Beach Dear Dr. Matthews, The purpose of this letter is to request your assistance regarding the possible relocation of the Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) into a building that is currently leased by the State Division of Historical Resources. The property, known as the Judge Knott building, is a historically designated structure located at 20 N. Swinton Avenue in Delray Beach. It is owned by the City and leased to the State for a nominal fee. The leasing period, which began in September of 1995, runs for twenty years, however, either party has the ability to terminate the lease upon sixty (60) days notice. The State subleases a portion of the building to the local Historical Society. That sublease is also subject to a termination clause (copies of lease and sublease enclosed). The building is approximately 2,800 square feet in size. The State has one employee in the building, Bonnie Dearborn. The Historical Society has another employee, Mary Swinford, who uses space in the building. However, the Historical Society is currently renovating another historic building that they will eventually occupy as their office. My agency, the CRA, must move its offices due to the upcoming relocation of the public library onto property that we currently own. This is a project that will significantly improve the library's facilities and enhance our West Atlantic Avenue Redevelopment Area. We have been investigating alternative locations for our offices for some time now, and are finding ourselves to be victims of our own success. Real estate in Delray Beach is extremely expensive to buy or lease. We are funded by local property tax revenues, and my objective is to be as prudent with those funds as possible. I would prefer to use the money we receive on programs and projects that further the redevelopment of our blighted areas, as opposed to paying rent. In recent months Ms. Dearborn and I discussed the possibility of the CRA moving into the Judge Knott building, and at first she was very open to the idea. Because it is a City-owned building the costs would be significantly less than what our agency would otherwise have to pay. The building is located in the heart of our redevelopment area and is across the street from City Hall. It is large enough to accommodate our seven-person agency. Ms. Dearborn indicated that she could move her operation into a section of the building that is accessed separately from the main building. We would share the meeting room on the first floor, and would keep all exhibit materials in place. Ms. Swinford was also amenable to the idea, as she would eventually be moving out. V4S. i Dr. Janet Snyder Matthews Page 2 They have both since decided that they want to stay in the building, and by their leases they are certainly entitled to do so. I called Ms. Dearborn and requested that we meet with City Manager David Harden to discuss some alternatives, but she refused to meet with me on the matter. She held a meeting separately with Mr. Harden, and since I was not in attendance I can only relay to you what he told me about the meeting. As an alternative to sharing space with us, he offered to provide her and Mary with their own office space in the City Attorney's building, free of charge. The City Attorney's office is located approximately one block away from the Judge Knott building. The space they were offered has three individual offices and separate access, although it admittedly does not have the historic character of their current location. If I had been invited to attend the meeting I would have added that our agency would be glad to pay any costs associated with fixing the space to their specifications, as well as all moving expenses. They could also continue to use the meeting facilities in the Judge Knott building whenever required. Ms. Dearborn apparently felt that the space would not be acceptable for her uses, and told the City Manager that she was not interested. Although the City has the ability to terminate the lease at her present location, Mr. Harden is understandably reluctant to do so. Given the fact that the lease is between the City and the State, and not between the City and Ms. Dearborn, I thought I would inform your office of the situation and see if there is any room for negotiation on this matter, either to share space with Ms. Dearborn or to assist her in relocating to the other building. Again, we are a public agency charged with redevelopment of the older sections of the City. This includes, among other things, historic preservation activities. We in fact were involved in the restoration project that brought the Judge Knott building from West Palm Beach to its current location, and we recently approved a $50,000 grant to the Historical Society for their office building restoration. We provided significant funding and oversight of the restoration of the Solomon D. Spady house into a museum of African American history, and we continue to support their programs and expansion activities. We have a historic facade easement program that promotes the restoration of historic structures in the CRA district, and one that focuses specifically on homes in the historic African American West Settler's district. We are currently charged with implementing the City's Downtown Master Plan and the Southwest Neighborhood Plan, both of which include infrastructure and affordable housing projects that total millions of dollars. If we have to buy or rent space in another building, it will literally cost us hundreds of thousands of dollars over the next several years. I would much prefer to keep those funds available for these important projects. I realize that you are under no obligation whatsoever to respond to this letter, and I do not wish to burden you with our agency's problem. However, I do hope you will agree that this opportunity to conserve significant public dollars deserves further exploration, and that your agency will work with us to see if there is an arrangement that can reasonably accommodate everyone's needs. I appreciate any assistance you can provide in this matter. I can be reached at (561) 276-8640. Sincerely, Diane Colonna Executive Director c: David T. Harden, City Manager Howard Ellingsworth, Chairman, CRA Attachments: Lease and sublease July 29, 2003 FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF STATE Glenda E. Hood Secretary of State DIVISION OF HISTORICAL RESOURCES "~": 1 - 2003 CiTY MANAGER Ms. Diane Colonna, Executive Director Delray Beach Community Redevelopment Agency 104 West Atlantic Avenue Delray Beach, :Florida 33444 Dear Ms. Colonna, Thank you for your letter of July 22, 2003 with regard to the Judge Knott Building in Delray Beach. This morning, this office signed the Restated Sublease Agreement for partial use of this property by the Delray Beach Historical Society for the next year. While we are greatly appreciative of your preservation efforts in the Delray Beach area and in the State of Florida, we cannot accommodate your request for relocation of our satellite office. Thank you for your interest in this matter. Sincerely, Janet Snyder Matthews, Ph.D., Director Bonnie Dearborn r~avid T. Harden(City Manager JSM/arm 500 S. Bronough Street · Tallalmssee, FL 32399-0250 · http://www.flheritage.com f'l Director's Office r'l Archaeological Research ri Historic Preservation ri Historical Museums (850) 245-6300 · FAX: 245-6435 (850~2,45-6444 · FAX: 245-6436 (850) 245-6333 · FAX: 245-6437 (850) 245-6400 · FAX: 245-6433 El Palm Beach Regional Office I'1 St. Augustine Regional Office I'1 Tampa Regional Office (561) 279-1475 · FAX: 279-1476 (904) 825-5045 · FAX: 825-5044 (813) 272-3843 · FAX: 272-2340 Dear Palm Beach Post Editor, Two recent articles on the Delray CRA's potential move into the historic Judge Knott building on Swinton Avenue characterized our agency as being anti-preservationist. Nothing could be further from the truth. Since its inception, the CRA has spent millions of dollars on preservation activities. In the mid 1990's we spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to save the Judge Knott building and another historic cottage from demolition. We acquired the property that the buildings now sit on, helped to relocate the structures from the airport expansion area in West Palm Beach, restored the smaller cottage, and constructed a parking lot so that both buildings could be used as offices for public agencies. The CRA has contributed substantial funding towards such public preservation projects as Old School Square, the Solomon D. Spady Museum, and most recently, restoration of the local preservation society's future offices on the Cason Cottage complex, CRA funding helped to beautify historic Banker's Row, which encouraged the investment of private dollars to preserve the unique homes and cottages on that street. We established the West Settler's Advisory Board and have committed hundreds of thousands of dollars in grant funds to restore homes in that African American historic district. We have given historic faCade grants to several businesses throughout the City to encourage preservation instead of demolition. In exchange for the grants we retain perpetual easements over the facades to ensure that they are maintained in accordance with State preservation standards. As much as we strive to preserve Delray's past, we are not always able to do so. We are a public agency funded by tax dollars. Preservation takes a tremendous amount of resources, and there have been times when we have made the difficult decision to demolish a structure instead of relocating or restoring it. We do not make those decisions lightly, but there are many needs and priorities that have to be balanced. We do the best that we can. There simply is not enough public money to save everything. Our interest in moving to the Judge Knott building is similarly motivated by a desire to use public funds efficiently. It is a two-story, 2,800 sq. fi. building that is owned by the City and leased to the State for a nominal fee. There is one state employee in the building, and an employee from the local preservation society who subleases space but who will ultimately move to the office on the Cason Cottage property. The CRA has seven employees. We have to move in order to accommodate the new public library. It will cost us hundreds of thousands of dollars over the next several years to buy or lease office space somewhere in our district. It would cost a fraction of that to lease space from the City. I spoke to the state preservation officer about the possibility of sharing space with her in the Judge Knott building. When she declined, the City Manager offered her alternative space in the City Attorney's building free of charge, which she also declined. I subsequently wrote to Jan Matthews, head of the State Division of Historic Resources, explaining how much state and local money could be saved if we worked together on this venture. She responded simply that they are not open to moving at this time. I am frankly appalled that they will not even consider a discussion on the matter. We are all public servants and should be doing everything we can to work together to use our limited resources wisely. It seems logical to me that the less money the CRA expends on rent, the more we have available for preservation activities, but apparently the state is more concerned that they not be inconvenienced. In my opinion, this is the kind of attitude that leads the public to believe that government employees are wasteful bureaucrats who are throwing their hard earned money out the window. So now we are exploring the more costly option of purchasing the building from the City. This would accomplish several objectives: it will give the CRA a permanent home in the center of our district, the City will sell an underutilized building and receive money that can be used for other public purposes, and the historic Judge Knott building will remain in the public domain for generations to come. If the decision is made to acquire the building we will work with the state to make sure that they have sufficient space on the premises or elsewhere to continue their operations. In conclusion, the Post has failed to give its readers a true and full picture of the issue and instead has resorted to an unfair characterization of the CRA. I hope this letter clarifies matters for your readers. Sincerely, Diane Colonna Executive Director Delray Beach CRA SECOND RESTATED LEASE OF THE PROPERTY KNOWN AS THE MONTEREY HOUSE THIS RESTATED LEASE is between the CITY OF DELRAY BEACH (the City or Lessor) and FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION (~F HISTORICAL ?, RESOURCES (FDHR or Lessee) is entered into this ]~ '~ day of~, 2002. WlTNESSETH: WHEREAS, the Restated Lease dated August 11, 1999 between the City and the entity known as is the Flodda Department of State Division of Historical Resources is required to be modified to reflect the change in the rent, repair and replacement fees; and WHEREAS, for ease of future reference, the Lease has again been restated as provided for herein. NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and promises herein contained, the parties agree as follows: 1. Demise and Description. Lessor hereby leases to Lessee, and Lessee hereby leases from Lessor, that certain property, hereinafter referred to as the 'premises," situate in Delray Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida, described as follows: (Attached hereto as Exhibit 'A") together with the following described fumiture, fixtures, equipment, and other property located in and about the premises, if any: all air conditioning equipment, water heaters, well pumps, and another other mechanical fixtures located on the demised premises; and together with the non exclusive fight of and to all easements, rights, privileges and appurtenances thereurito belonging or in any way appertaining or in any matter connected therewith and relating to the use of the premises included, but not limited to nine (9) parking spaces as shown in property association and condominium documents. 2. Commencement and Term. The term of this Lease shall be for a period of twenty (20) years commencing September' 13, 1995 (said date being sometimes hereinafter referred to as the "commencement date" and said month and day being sometimes hereinafter referred to as the Lease "anniversary date"),~ unless sooner terminated pursuant to the terms herein. Upon the expiration of the initial term, this Lease may be renewed upon the express written agreement of the Lessor and Lessee for successive periods of five (5) years. 3. Use of Premises. It is represented by Lessee that the demised premises will be used for the following purpose(s): office, meetings, and other public events which carry out the Lessee's business. Lessee shall be limited to this use in the absence of Lessor's prior written consent to another use, which may be arbitrarily withheld. The Lessee understands and agrees that its right to use the second floor room is non-exclusive and that the Delray Beach Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) shall also have the nonexclusive right to use the second floor room for the Lessor of ten (10) years, or the time during which the CRA shall own or occupy the bungalow, located at 24 North Swinton Avenue, adjacent to the subject property. The Lessee understands and agrees that its right to use the nine parking spaces referred to in Paragraph I is non-exclusive and that the City shall also have the right to use the nine spaces for parking when not in use by Lessee and for special events. 2 4. Rent~ Repair and Replacement. The fixed annual minimum rent payable by Tenant during the time of the Lease shall be One dollar ($1.00). Lessee shall also pay a monthly fee in the amount of One Hundred Fifty-Five Dollars ($155.00) to Lessor payable on the first day of each month to cover the estimated cost of repair and replacement of structural components which shall include, but not be limited to, the .roof, air-conditioning, plumbing systems and appliances located on the described property. This fee shall be adjusted from time to time in order to create a fund sufficient to cover repair and replacement expenses. Furthermore, the City shall provide monthly invoices to the Delray Beach Historical Society (Sub-Lessee) and the money paid by Sub-Lessee shall offset the amount of rent, repair and replacement and the fees referenced in Paragraph 11 that the Lessee owes the City every month. 5. Utilities. The Lessee shall pay all charges for telephone, power, water, sewer, gas and any other utilities used in conneCtion with the Property. 6. Taxes. The Lessee shall pay any ad valorem taxes imposed upon the Property and improvements located thereon during the term of this Lease. The Lessee shall pay any taxes for personal property or improvements owned by the Lessee. 7. Insurance. The Lessee shall pay all premiums and shall maintain and provide insurance for the entire lease term and renewals thereto, in such amounts and under such terms as may be required by Lessor. The Lessor shall review and modify the terms and requirements of such insurance, if necessary, on a yearly basis. The minimum insurance amounts and terms shall be pursuant to the following requirements: 3 A. Public Liability Insurance: Lessee shall maintain public liability · 'insurance in coverage limits of no less than one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) combined single limit for bodily injury and property damage liability. B. Workers Compensation Insurance: The Lessee shall maintain workers compensation coverage in an amount equal to the statutory limits of employer's liability. C. Professional Liability Insurance: Lessee shall require all design professionals engaged in restoration and/or renovation of the property to have professional liability insurance in an amount acceptable to the Lessor's Risk Manager. D. Additional Insured:- The Lessor shall be named as an additional insured on the policy required in Paragraph A. E. Insurance Certificates: The Lessee shall submit insurance certificates evidencing insurance of the type and the amounts above stated or otherwise agreed to be the parties. F. Written Notice of Cancellation: The Lessee shall provide certificates of insurance which shall give the Lessor thirty (30) days written notice of cancellation. 8. Alterations and Improvements. The Lessee shall be entitled to make such alte'rations, changes and improvements to the Property as the Lessee in its discretion deems desirable to carry out its plan for the restoration and development of the Property, and which are consistent with architectural plans and designs as 4 approved by the Lessor (in order to keep the intedor and exterior of the property in keeping with its historical purposes) and with the laws and ordinances of the State of Florida and the City of Delray Beach. 9. Assi_~nment and Subleasina - Recordin_~. (a) The Lessee may not assign or sublease all or any portion of the Property, to any person, firm, corporation, or other entity, without the priOr written approval of the Lessor, which approval shall be in the sole discretion of the Lessor. If approved by the Lessor, the sub-lease or assignment shall be in writing and expressly be subject to all the terms and conditions of this Agreement and shall conform to all applicable laws, grant requirements and limitations, ordinances and regulations and property association documents, rules, regulations and condominium association, bylaws. (b) Subparagraph (a) shall not apply to special events or special property uses contemplated in the management agreement or budget, or brief uses of the Property by the public. (c) The Lessee shall not assign any of its dghts or obligations under this Lease without the prior written consent of the Lessor. (d) This Lease shall not be recorded. 10. Maintenance. The Lessee shall maintain the leased premises, including but not limited to the heating and air-conditioning equipment and excluding the extedor walls, parking lot, exterior landscaping and irrigation, roof and other structural members of the building in such or better condition as the same were at the commencement of this lease term or at the renewal thereof, reasonable wear and tear and damage by fire or other unavoidable casualty excepted. It is explicitly agreed that the duty of the Lessee shall include furnishing all necessary janitorial and cleaning services, pest control service, care and maintenance of the structures located on the Property and any interior renovation or redecoration not involving major structural changes. 11. Rules and Regulations. Lessee agrees to comply with the maintenance responsibilities and rules and regulations and pay all fees as contained in the association documents, which is estimated to be approximately $270.71 per month at the current time, and as may be amended from time to time. 12. Equipment and Fixtures. All equipment, furniture, supplies and personal property that are not fixtures installed in the Property by the Lessee shall at all times remain the property of the Lessee which shall have the right to remove the same from the Property at any time during the term hereof. 13. Fire or Other Unavoidable Casualty. In. case the premises or any part thereof shall at any time during the term of this Lease be destroyed or damaged by flm, act of God or other causes beyond the control of the Lessor, and through no fault or neglect on the part of the Lessor, then the Lessor shall be under no obligation to repair or re-erect the leased structure, provided; however, the Lessor shall refund to the Lessee monies that may be in the repair and replacement fund as set forth in Paragraph 4 which exceeds the City's cost of purchasing the property adjusted for inflation. If the condition of the leased premises should be so rendered unsuitable by 6 the foregoing causes, either party to this Lease Agreement shall have the option to cancel this Lease. Quiet Enjoyment. The Lessee shall peaceably hold and enjoy the leased 14. premises. 15. Default and Ri.qht*of Reentry. In the event that the Lessee shall fail to perform any act required of it under this Lease or to otherwise comply with any term or provision hereof and such failure shall continue for thirty (30) days or more after written notice given to the Lessee by the Lessor, then the Lessor may terminate this Lease Agreement and the Lessee shall promptly surrender possession and vacate the premises, and the Lessor may, immediately or at any time thereafter, enter into the premises and repossess the same as of its former estate and expel the Lessee, but without prejudice to any remedies which might otherwise be used by the Lessor for arrears of rent or any other breach of the Lessee's covenants or the waiver of any rights of the Lessor. 16. Cancellation. The Lessor and the Lessee each hereby reserve the right to terminate this Lease at any time in the future (either during the initial term or any renewal), upon sixty (60) days written notice to the other party at the address set forth in this Lease Agreement; provided, however, that in the event of termination by the Lessor, prior to the initial term of the Lease, the Lessor agrees that it shall make reimbursements to the Lessee for any costs for capital expenditure additions to the structure, (less grant funds, bond funds or City funds previously transferred to Lessee), subject to available funding, (but not for regular maintenance or care items) except if 7 such termination .be for breach of this Lease Agreement or violation of or failure to comply with any of the covenants set forth herein. 17. Amendment. No amendment or modification to this Lease shall be effected unleSs in writing and signed by both of the parties hereto. 18. Inspection by Lessor. The Lessee shall permit the Lessor and its agents or representatives to enter upon the Property at all reasonable times to examine the condition thereof, and to make any repairs which it may see fit to make. 19. To Yield Up Premises. At the expiration of the term of this Lease, the Lessee will peaceably yield up to the Lessor the Premises and all buildings thereof, in good repair in all respects, reasonable use and wear and damage 'by fire and other unavoidable casualties excepted. 20. Indemnification. Lessee shall be responsible for any claims of in negligence to the extent that such claims arise from the Lessee's activities connection with the Monterey House and are covered under the Department's liability coverage pursuant to section 768.28, Florida Statutes. Lessee shall cooperate to the fullest extent possible with the Lessor and the Florida Division of Risk Management to facilitate the speedy resolution of any such claims made pursuant to section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes. 21. Notice. Whenever notice is required hereunder, it shall be by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed as follows, or delivered by hand to the location as follows until written notice of change of address is given to the other party: 8 Lessor:' Lessee: City Manager's Office 100 N.W. 1 st Avenue Delray Beach, Florida 33444 Florida Department of State Division of Historical Resources Southeast Florida Regional Reservation Office P.O. Box 1221 20 North Swinton Avenue Delray Beach, FI 33447-1221 22. Number; Gender. be deemed to include the plural, and the masculine form shall be deemed to include the feminine and neuter. 23. To Bear Risk for Contents. That all building contents and interior improvements of any kind (whether owned by the Lessor or Lessee) that may be on the premises during the continuance of this Lease shall be at the sole risk of the Lessee, and that the. Lessor shall not be liable to the Lessee or any other person for any injury, loss or damage to the property or to any person on the premises. 24. Not to Iniure or Deface. The Lessee covenants that it will not injure, overload or deface, or allow to be injured, overloaded or defaced, the Property or any part thereof. 25. Other Remedies. Mention in this lease of any particular remedy in favor of the Lessor shall not preclude the Lessor from any other remedy in law or in equity and shall be in addition to any other remedies conferred upon it by law or in equity. As the Context herein may require, the singular shall 26. No Waiver. That no assent, expressed or implied, by the Lessor to any breaCh 'of'th-is Agreement shall be deemed to be a waiver of any succeeding breach of the same or other covenants. 27. Severability. If any clause, phrase, provision or portion of this Agreement or the application thereof to any person or circumstance shall be held by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable under the laws of the State of Flodda, or any other pertinent jurisdiction, such event shall not affect, impair or render invalid or unenforceable the application of the remainder of this Agreement or any other clause, phrase, provision or portion hereof to any person or entity in any circumstances. 28: Entire Aareement. This Agreement constitutes the complete understanding and agreement between the parties and supersedes any and all prior oral or wdtten agreements and understandings. IN WITNESS THEREOF, the Lessor and Lessees have set their hands and seals the day and year first above written. ATTEST: City Clerk Ap.proved as to Forrp; CITY OF DELRAY BEACH, FLORIDA David W. $¢hmidt, Mayor FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF H~STORICAL RESOURCES ~//Janet-Sny~j~r Matthews, Ph. D - (SEAL) l0 STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY Of ~ The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this ~'~ day of ~14~t~ , 2002, by ~ (name of officer or agent, title of officer or agent) of ' ~' ,' ' , a Florida state agency, on behalf of the agency. I~J~/She is personally knowQ to me or has produced as identification. ~f Florida GABRIEl., ROEDER, SMITH & COMPANY Consultants & Actuaries 301 East Las Olas Blvd. · Suite 200 · Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301-2254 · 954-527-1616 · FAX 954-525-0083 June 10, 2003 Mr. Joseph Safford Director of Finance City of Delray Beach 100 Northwest 1st Avenue Delray Beach, Flodda 33~.~.~ Re: Proposed Changes to Police and Firef~jhters Retirement System Dear Joe: Pursuant to your request, we have prepared the enclosed Supplemental Actuarial Valuation Report. This Report shows the actuarial impact of the following: (a) Raise the multiplier for future service to 3.25% from 3% for members who complete 20 or more years of service and raise the maximum pension to 81.25% of average final compensation from 75%. (b) Raise the multiplier for future service to 3.50% from 3% for members who complete 20 or more years of service and raise the maximum pension to 87.50% of average final compensation from 75%. Members of the System (police officers and firefighters) would have to contribute an additional 1.10% of pay to cover the additional cost associated with alternate (a) or 2.19% for alternate (b). The total member contribution rate would be 4.10% under (a) or 5.19% under (b). We welcome your questions and comments. Sincerely yours, J. Stephen Palmquist SUPPLEMENTAL ACTUARIAL VALUATION REPORT Plan City of Delray Beach Police and Firefighters Retirement System Valuation Date October 1, 2001 Date of Report June 9, 2003 Report Requested by City Manager Prepared by J. Stephen Palmquist Group Valued Police Officers and Firefighters who have not retired and who have not entered the DROP. Plan Provisions Being Considered for Change Present Provision Before Change 3% multiplier w!th 75% cap, 3% member contribution rate Proposed Change a) 3.25% multiplier for future service and a 3% multiplier for past service with 81.25% cap, 4.10% member contribution rate; or b) 3.50% multiplier for future service and a 3% multiplier for past service with 87.50% cap, 5.19% member contribution rate Participants Affected Police Officers and Firefighters not retired and not in DROP Actuarial Assumptions and Methods Same as October 1, 2001 Actuarial Valuation Report with no exceptions. Some of the key assumptions/methods are: Investment return - 8.5% per year Salary increase - §.0% per year Cost Method - Entry Age Normal Amortization Period for Any Increase in Actuarial Accrued Liability 30 years Summary of Data Used in Report N/A. Actuarial Impact of Proposal(s) See attached page(s). Under the proposal, members of the Retirement System would be required to pay for the proposed changes. The member contribution rate would increase from 3% of pay to either 4.10% for alternate (a), or 5.19% for alternate (b). Special Risks Involved With the Proposal That the Plan Has Not Been Exposed to Previously None. Other Cost Considerations As a result of negative stock market retums since September 30, 2001, there will be a loss from investments for the year ended September 30, 2002. Unless there are offsetting gains from other sources, the October 1, 2002 actuarial valuation report will show a cost increase. Users of this Supplemental Report should be aware of likely future cost increases over and above those shown in this Report. Possible Conflicts W'rth IRS Qualification Rules None J. almquist, ASA, , FCA Enrolled Actuary 02-1560 GABRIEL, ROEDER, SMITH & COMPANY GABRIEL, ROEDER, SMITH & COMPANY Consultants & Actuaries 301 East Las Olas Blvd. · Suite 200 · Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301-2254 · 954-527-1616 · FAX 954-525-0083 February 18, 2003 Mr. Jim Tabeek Professional Firefighters and Paramedics of Delray Beach Local !842 501 West Atlantic Boulevard Delray Beach, Florida 33444 Re: Proposed Changes to Police and Firefighters Retirement System Dear Jim: Pursuant to your request, we have prepared the enclosed Supplemental Actuarial Valuation Report. This Report shows the aCtuarial impact of the following: (a) (b) Raise the multiplier to 3.25% from 3% for members who complete 20 or more years of service and raise the maximum pension to 81.25% of average final compensation from 75%. Raise the multiplier to 3.50% from 3% for-members who complete 20 or more years of service and raise the maximum pension to 87.50% of average final compensation from 75%. These proposals have been valued as though the increased multiplier would apply to past service already accumulated as well as future service. Members of the System (police officers and firefighters) would have to contribute an additional 3.39% of pay to cover the additional cost associated with alternate (a) or 6.79% for alternate (b). The total member contribution rate would be 6.39% under (a) or 9.79% under (b). We welcome your questions and comments. Sincerely yours, J. Stephen Palmq~ JSP/or SUPPLEMENTAL ACTUARIAL VALUATION REPORT Plan City of Delray Beach Police and Firefighters Retirement System Valuation Date October 1, 2001 Date of Report February 18, 2003 Report Requested by Professional Firefighters and Paramedics of Delray Beach Prepared by J. Stephen Palmquist Group Valued Police Officers and Firefighters who have not retired and who have not enteredthe DROP. Plan Provisions Being Considered for Change Present Provision Before Chan.qe 3% multiplier with 75% cap, 3% member contribution rate Proposed Chan.qe a) 3.25% multiplier with 81.25% cap, 6.39% member contribution rate; or b) 3.50% multiplier witl~ 87.50% cap, 9.79% member contribution rate Participants Affected Police Officers and Firefighters not retired and not in DROP Actuarial Assumptions and Methods Same as October 1, 2001 Actuarial Valuation Report with no exceptions. Some of the key assumptions/methods are: Investment return - 8.5% per year Salary increase - 6.0% per year Cost Method - Entry Age Normal GABRIEL, ROEDER, SMITH & COMPANY Amortization Period for Any Increase in Actuarial Accrued Liability 30 years Summary of Data Used in Report N/A. Actuarial Impact of Proposal(s) See attached page(s). Under the proposal, members of the Retirement System would be required to pay for the proposed changes. The member contribution rate would increase from 3% of pay to either 6.39% for alternate (a), or 9.79% for alternate (b). Special Risks Involved With the Proposal That the Plan Has Not Been Exposed to Previously None. Other Cost Considerations As a result of negative stock market returns since September 30, 2001, there will be a loss from investments for the year ended September 30, 2002. Unless there are offsetting gains from other sources, the October 1, 2002 actuarial valuation report will show a cost increase. Users of this Supplemental Report should be aware of likely future cost increases over and above those shown in this Report. Possible Conflicts With IRS Qualification Rules None GABRIEL, ROEDER, SMITH & COMPANY FILE COPY £1TY OF DELRFIY BER£H DELRAY BEACH 100 N.W. 1st AVENUE · NI-America City 1993 2001 DELRAY BEACH, FLORIDA 33444 Mr. William S. Adams, Chairman of the Board of Trustees Police and Firefighters Retirement System c/o Anne Woods 609 Homewood Boulevard Delray Beach, Florida 33445 · 561/243-7000 Dear Mr. Adams: This is to acknowledge receiving your letter of May 23, 2003, concerning the proposed changes in the Police and Firefighters Retirement System to increase the multiplier from 3% to 3½%. In response to the Board's request, I will present the requested benefit change to the City Commission at the earliest appropriate opportunity. Chief Schroeder has expressed serious concerns about the impact on retention and recruitment in the Police Department which would result from increasing the employee contribution from 3% to 9.79%. I share his concern and also have other serious reservations as discussed in the enclosed position paper. Personally, I do not think the multiplier should be increased. As I outlined in my recommendations, however, should the City Commission determine that it is in the City's best interest to increase the multiplier, there are alternative approaches to doing so which would, I believe, better serve the interests of individual plan participants as well as the City. I will let yOu know when this matter is to be considered by the City Commission. Sincerely, David 1. Harden City Manager DTH/gb Enclosure CC: City Commission Members of the Police and Fire Retirement System Board Chief Schroeder Chief Koen Lieutenant Tabeek Officer Jeroloman EFFORT ALWAYS MATTERS Proposed Multiplier Increase For Police/Fire Pensions The majority of our Police officers and firefighters have voted to request that the multiplier used for calculating their pension benefit be increased fi:om 3% per year of service to 3 ½% per year of service. The employees involved propose to pay for this benefit increase by increasing their contribution to the pension plan fi:om 3% to 9.79% of their compensation. The purpose of this paper is to discuss various factors which the Commission should take into consideration in deciding how to respond to this request, and to give you my recommendations. The Purpose of Pensions. When considering any major change in pension benefits, I believe one should start by considering why we have a pension plan and the ultimate goal of pension plans in general. In general, the purpose of a pension plan is to ensure that when someone retires, they will have an adequate income for the remainder of their life. For purposes of this discussion, let's assume that one would enter the work force in their late teens or early twenties, and work for 40 years before retiring. If the person in our example accrued a pension or retirement benefit equal to 2 ½% per year for each year in the work force, they would be able to retire with a pension equal to 100% of their average final compensation. Our police and fire pension plan currently pays a benefit of 3% for each year of service to anyone retiring after 20 years of service. Thus someone retiring after 20 years of service receives a pension of 60% of their average final compensation, or 75% after 25 years. And, unlike most private sector pensions, this benefit is payable immediately upon retirement with 20 or more years of service. Furthermore, beginning after the 25ta anniversary of the employee's date of hire, the pension benefit is increased between one and four percent annually to offset inflation. Since 1958 the City has also provided Social Security coverage for Police Officers and Firefighters. A Firefighter or Police Officer retiring after 25 or more years of service would, upon reaching Social Security retirement age, receive combined pension and Social Security benefits equaling or exceeding their salary while working. When considering further increasing retirement benefits for public employees, I believe several questions need to be asked: 1. How large a retirement benefit is it appropriate to require taxpayers to support for public employees? Should taxpayers be required to support retirement benefits exceeding the wages an employee earns while working? 2. Is it reasonable to expect ones entire retirement benefit to be funded from half of ones working life? Why Have a High Multiplier? Statewide there are 321 Fire and/or Police pension plans operating pursuant to F.S. 175/185. These plans have multipliers ranging from a low of 1.7% to a high of 4%. Accepting for a moment the argument that one should not expect to acquire more than half of ones pension benefits in half of ones working life, then is there any justification for having a high multiplier, looking at the issue philosophically?. There are indeed two reasons which would justify a high multiplier: (1) If the pension benefit has no built in cost of living adjustment, then a high beginning benefit would offset, to some extent, the effects of future inflation; and (2) There are some cities which do not provide Social Security coverage. For these cities, a high multiplier would offset the absence of this benefit. I must point out, however, that there are cities which provide COLA's and Social Security coverage and still have a high multiplier. Is our multiplier competitive? As previously stated, our current multiplier for anyone retiring with 20 or more years of service is 3%. Of the 321 comparable plans in the state, only 47 have a multiplier greater than 3%. Slightly over half of the plans are at the 3% multiplier. (See attached graph) Looking at 18 plans in Palm Beach, Broward, and Dade counties, eight provide for a multiplier exceeding 3%for some portion of the employee's service, but only two exceed 3% for all service. (See attached graph) I would also point out that our multiplier was 2 ~% for many years and was just increased to 3% for those retiring with 20 years or more of service in 1999. In my opinion, our current multiplier is still competitive in both the statewide and the local labor market. The multiplier appears to be more important to firefighters than to police officers in deciding where to accept employment, but I believe that take home pay is much more important to both than pension benefits. Is the proposal fair to all participants? The proposal is to increase the multiplier to 3 ½% for all service, both prior and future, of currently active employees. As was noted in the introductory paragraph, the cost of this benefit increase is 6.79% of payroll. At my request, our actuaries have determined the cost of increasing the multiplier for future service only. This cost is 2.19%. In other words, the police officer or flrefighter we just hired this year would be forced to pay 4.6% of his or her salary so that the employee who retires immediately after this change can receive this increased retirement benefit free of charge. To me, this is grossly unfair. It would be wrong for the City to force our younger emPloyees to pay the cost of gifting our older employees with a bigger pension. Will the members, in fact, pay all the costs? This proposal has been advanced as a benefit improvement which the employees affected would pay for. In other words, this benefit improvement would be at "no cost to the City." As was shown in the previous paragraph, even if it is at no cost to the City, it is at great cost to our younger employees. The Commission must also keep in mind the fact that the cost of the benefit increase as a percentage of payroll is based on an assumed investment return of 8 ½% and an assumed salary increase of 6% per year. Since 1977 the average investment remm has been 8.2% and the average salary increase has been 7.9% annually. For the last three years these factors have been as follows: Year 1999 2000 2001 Investment Return 5.2% 6.6% 3.7% Salary Increases 7.5% 7.3% 9.0% In any year when the projected investment return is not met or salary increases exceed projections, the City must pay the additional contribution required. This would have been true for the last three years, thus increasing even further the large increases in pension contributions the City has had to make. Our actuary has warned us that investment returns were well below projections again for 2002, which will for the fourth year force the City to substantially increase its contribution. There is no provision for the employees to pay the additional costs involved. The Commission should also be aware that in 1989, when the "20 and out" benefit was adopted for firefighters and police officers, the employees argued that they were paying most of the cost by increasing their contribution. Then, a few years later, they began arguing that their contribution was too high and needed to be reduced in order to attract new employees. In 1999 we reduced the required employee contribution from 7.33% to 3% in response to this complaint, and because of competition from the Sheriff's Department where the pension contribution is zero. What is the expected impact of the proposal on future recruitment and retention? Chief Koen and Chief Schroeder believe that the impact of the proposed change would be different for fire and police. We believe the change would have no impact on retention of personnel who have been here more than five or six years, assuming our pay plans remain fairly competitive. While I have no Statistical data, based on the observations of Chief Koen and both Chief Overman and Chief Schroeder, an entry level firefighter is more likely to stay until retirement than an entry level police officer. Police officers have a higher likelihood of changing careers due to burnout or for other reasons, and not reaching retirement as a police officer. Therefore, the retirement benefit may be more important to an entry level firefighter in deciding where to initially accept employment. Police officers, on the other hand, appear to be more concerned about take home pay and less about retirement benefits. We believe this difference is reflected in the different vote on this issue in the two groups. A large number of younger police officers voted against the proposed change. Chief Schroeder believes that many of our young officers with five years or less experience would leave our department if this change were adopted as proposed. While it might help us some in firefighter recruitment, it would not help and would probably hurt in recruiting police officers. Since a pension deduction of 7.33% was causing us recruitment problems in 1999, I would certainly expect a deduction of 9.79% could cause serious recruitment and retention problems for police officers. Other options for increased retirement benefits. Police officers and firefighters have said that they would pay for this benefit by increasing their contribution to the pension plan. The City has in place two plans which allow employees to save money for retirement on a voluntary basis, a 457 (deferred compensation) plan and a 40la plan. Even at relatively low rates of return, the retirement benefit an employee could accumulate over 20 years by putting 6.79% of their pay into either one of these plans would far exceed the value of a ½% increase in their pension multiplier. Again, that is because the proposal which has been put forward produces a windfall for those employees within six or seven years of retirement at the expense of those employees with less seniority From the employee's perspective, the other advantage of the proposal is that all of the investment risk is shifted from the employee to the City taxpayer. With the 457 and 40la plans, the employee bears the market risk. What are options for implementing the proposal? As requested. The Commission could adopt the proposal as put forward by the employees. That is, all active employees, as of the effective date of the change, would have a pension multiplier of 3 ½% per year of service when retiring with 20 or more years of service. New Hires only. If the Commission concluded that our having a 3% multiplier while some other South Florida departments have higher multipliers was making it difficult for us to attract new employees, the multiplier could be increased to 3 ½% for employees hired after the effective date of the change. While current employees were hired with the 3% multiplier, or even 2 ½%, I believe this approach would create significant morale problems, and I would not recommend it. Beginning this plan year forward. Under this approach, all service after the effective date of the change would accrue pension benefits at 3 ½% per year. For service prior to the effective date of the change the benefit would be calculated at 3% per year of service. This approach to changing benefits is fairly common, and it is the alternative evaluated by the actuaries at my request. Optional for participants. Another alternative is to allow plan participants the option of increasing their benefit from 3% to 3 ½% per year of service by electing to increase their contribution to the pension plan. This should be an irrevocable option, available to plan members annually on their anniversary date. The disadvantages are that it complicates plan administration, and still places on our taxpayers the burden of guaranteeing the benefit, regardless of what happens to pension fund investments. Recommendations. As I indicated in my introductory discussion, my personal opinion is that our Fire and Police Pension is already extremely generous and the benefits should not be increased. Furthermore, the proposal put forward unjustly enriches employees within six or seven years of retirement at the expense of employees with less seniority. If the Commission, however, determines that it is in the best interest of the City to increase the multiplier for calculating police and fire retirement benefits, then I strongly recommend that the increase be made for service after the effective date of the change and at the option of each individual plan member. That makes the 3 ½% multiplier available for those employees who want it and are willing to pay for it. Those employees who want the money in their take home pay, or who would rather have it in an investment they control would have that option. If they feel they cannot afford the additional contribution now, they could make it later when they feel more able to do so. 0 0 0 0 0 C~ 0 0 0 0 O0 ~ 'q' C~4 0 O0 ~ ~ 04 o o Number of Plans TO: FROM: DATE: SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM David T. Harden, City Manager Susan Ruby, City Attorney fl Barbara Gafito, City Clerk ~' july 23, 2003 Possible Special Election Ballot Issue I contacted the Supetarisor of Elections office today and was advised it would not be a problem for us to hold a Special Election on November 4, 2003. The City would be required to pay all expenses incurred for this election. To date, their office has not been informed of a county-wide election for either November 2003 or March 2004. At this time the only election to be held on November 4* is Boynton's Munidpal Election. The deadline for the Supervisor of Elections to receive a certified copy of our ballot wording is September 4, 2003. She would appreciate it earlier if possible since it must be translated both audio and visual into Spanish. In addition, consideration by the Commission must be made as to whether they wish to translate into Creole. Pursuant to F.S. 100.151, notice needs to be given to the Supervisor of Elections and her consent obtained to hold a special election. We need to do this ASAP. I have advised her today that we are considering this possibility. Pursuant to Charter Section 5.07, the Commission must adopt a resolution calling for a special election at least 30 days in advance. This would have to be prior to Friday, October 3~. We would have to adopt this resolution on September 23, 2003. Additional requirements would be advertising once in the 5th week preceding the election and once in the third week preceding (F.S. 100.341). Again, Spanish advertising is mandated and Creole would be at the Commission discretion. In addition, we would need to advertise the ballot questions the week prior to the election. Bg cc: Chevelle Nubin, Deputy City Clerk XdS. I:IT¥ OF OELRrlV BEI:II:H 2003 CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 200 NW 1st AVENUE · DELRAY BEACH, FLORIDA 33444 TELEPHONE 561/243-7090 · FACSIMILE 561/278-4755 .Writer's Direct Line: 561/243-7090 DELRAY BEACH 1993 2001 DATE: TO: FROM: SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM August 1, 2003 City Commission David T. Harden, City Manager Department Heads Susan A. Ruby, City Attorney The Law Concerning the Education of the Merits of Bond Issue Public Regarding the Our office has researched the issue of whether City officials and employees can educate the public on the medts of a bond issue, and whether they may advocate its passage. The 4th District Court of Appeal in Palm Beach County v. Huspeth, 540 So.2d 147 (Fla. 4DCA 1989) indicated that employees (and public officials) could educate the public, but not advocate one position over another. Further, the court stated that the education must be fair and impartial when using public funds to educate the electorate. More recently, however, the Supreme Court'of Florida in People A.qainst Tax Revenue Mismanaqement, Inc. v. County of Leon, 583 So.2d 1373 (Fla. 1991) found that employees of the governing body could mount an information campaign regarding the referendum, including advocating that the tax in that case was needed to meet certain needs, provided that such conduct was consistent with state ethics laws. Id. at 1375. The Supreme Court of Florida in People stated that, "Leaders have both a duty and a right to say which course of action they think best, and to make fair use of their offices for this purpose". Id. The Supreme Court in People further stated that so long as public officials do not breach public trust or commit fraud on the public, then they may advocate the passage of bond issues. Id. at 1376. However, the advocacy in People was limited to why the tax was needed. In addition, the Court in People looked at ballot language and found by looking at the totality of the ballot language to determine how such referendum issues may August 1, 2003 Page 2 be construed by a reasonable voter and to determine if the Government provided a neutral forum. Id. In People, the following statement appeared on the ballot: "Take charge...Irs Your Future." (Local Government Infrastructure Sales Tax). The court concluded that despite the information campaign that advocated the tax, the campaign slogan appearing on the ballot urged voters merely to "take charge...it's your future." Id. Further, the Supreme Court reasoned that some voters may "take charge" by voting yes; others may "take charge" by voting no. Thus, the language on the ballot was found to lack neutrality only implicitly, because it was the campaign slogan of persons favoring the tax, but it was upheld because it did not violate the "neutral forum" of the election. Therefore, based on the foregoing, I would urge caution in this area and would suggest that officials and employees try to be as informational and educational as possible. The advocacy used in People was limited to why the tax in that case was needed by providing information in support of the tax without forcing a particular position for or against the passage of the tax upon the electorate while in the voting forum. I would suggest any advocacy be limited to the reasons why the referendum should be approved. In short, a certain amount of advocacy is permitted, so long as it is not misleading, fraudulent or imposed upon the electorate while at the ballot box. The advocacy should not go beyond the parameters set forth in the People case regarding why the measure is needed. Please call if you have any questions. SAR:s~ (Attached are the cases cited in the 583 So.2d 1373 16 Fla. L. Weekly S579 (Cite as: 583 So.2d 1373) I,I Supreme Court of Florida. PEOPLE AGAINST TAX REVENUE MISMANAGEMENT, INC., et al., Appellants, V. COUNTY OF LEON, Florida, Appellee. No. 77572. May 30, 1991. Proceeding was brought to validate a referendum authorizing sales tax to secure bond issue for construction of county jail and to provide other infrastructure. The Circuit Court, Leon County, N. Sanders Sauls, J., issued order validating referendum and appeal was taken by a private corporation which had as its purpose scmtinization of county government. The Supreme Court, Kogan, J., held that: (1) local government employees did not improperly advocate approval of sales tax increase referendum; (2) wording of ballot did not unfairly bias electorate; and (3) statutory proceeding to validate bond issues was proper forum for validating sales tax referendum which was designed to provide fimds to secure bond issue. AWu-rned; petition for reheating denied; petition for ancillary relief stricken. West Headnotes [1] Municipal Corporations ~::'917(1) 268k917(1) Most Cited Cases Municipality could name private corporation which had sued to challenge legality of referendum preceding bond issue as defendant in action brought to validate bond issue; validation proceeding was proper vehicle for quieting all legal and factual issues that might cast doubt on legal validity of issue and nothing prohibited county from joining as defendant corporation that had publicly announced its belief that referendum was unlawfully conducted. West's F.S.A. § 75.02. [2] Counties O=~81.1 104k81.1 Most Cited Cases Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Page 1 of 7 Page 1 (Formerly 104k81) Employees of county could mount information campaign regarding referendum to approve optional sales tax, including advocating that tax was needed to remedy problems at county jail and to meet local infrastructure needs such as new or widened roadways, provided such conduct was consistent with state ethics laws. [3] Counties ~=~190.1 104k190.1 Most Cited Cases (Formerly 104k190(1)) Ballot for sales tax referendum to f'mance local government infrastructure did not unfairly bias electorate, even though it contained a statement "take charge.., it's your future," which had been a slogan for advocates of the referendum, and also contained a statement that capital improvements to be constructed with proceeds were "critical"; voters could consider they were taking charge of their futures by voting either for or against referendum, and reference to "critical" improvements did not render ballot conclusively defective. West's F.S.A. § 75.01 et seq. [4] Counties O=>177 104k177 Most Cited Cases Statute specifically providing for public agency to bring proceeding to validate bond issue provided the procedure for challenging approval of county sales tax to finance bond issue for construction of jail and other infrastructure, even though it was claimed that challenge should have been brought under a general statute covering election disputes. West's F.S.A. §§ 75.02, 102.168. [51 Counties O='177 104k177 Most Cited Cases Statute providing for bringing of proceeding to validate bond referendum applied to election to approve a special sales t ax which would b e used t o provide funds to secure bond issue. West's F.S.A. § 100.321. [6] Judgment 228k650 Most Cited Cases Public interest corporation challenging sales tax Orig. U.S. Govt. Works http://print.west~aw.c~m/de~ivery.htm~?dest=atp&dataid=A~~558~~~~~~~968~~~4~5~~42~:... 7/29/2003 Page 2 of 7 583 So.2d 1373 16 Fla. L. Weekly S579 (Cite as: 583 So.2d 1373) referendum to provide financing for public improvements was precluded from raising, in appeal from court order validating referendum, claims adverse to lower court decisions in suits brought by corporation claiming that local county canvassing group was not party to suit and that certain judges should have been disqualified from hearing case; having chosen not to appeal lower court opinions in proper manner, counsel bound client to full legal effect of those opinions, under doctrine of res judicata. '1374 Kenneth Muszynski, Tallahassee, for appellants. Herbert W.A. Thiele, County Atty. and Michael L. Rosen and Susan L. Turner of Holland & Knight, Tallahassee, for appellee. KOGAN, Justice. We have on appeal on order of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit validating a $60 million bond issue for constmction of a new j ail a nd other infrastructure improvements in Leon County. Jurisdiction is mandato~. Art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const. Page 2 had failed to name the proper party. [FN1] This holding was upheld on appeal, and PATRM did not seek further review. People Against Tax Revenue Mismanagement, Inc. v. Leon County Canvassing Bd., 573 So.2d31 (Fla. lstDCA 1990). FN1. This conclusion was undeniably correct. See § 100.321, Fla. Stat. (1989). Subsequently, PATRM amended the petition to name the City of Tallahassee and the County of Leon as defendants. However, PATRM voluntarily dismissed its complaint and then filed a "Motion for Writ of Certiorari as Ancillap~ Relief" in its then-pending appeal from the canvassing-board case. The First District characterized this document in the following terms: In broad terms, appellants take issue with the trial court's attempt to schedule pretrial proceedings and to set the case for trial on the issues raised against the City and the County, who are neither parties to this appeal, nor parties to any action now pending below. After review, we f'md the motion to be totally frivolous .... We grant appellee's motion for an award of attorney fees and costs. This case comes to Court after much earlier litigation. The People Against Tax Revenue Mismanagement, Inc. (PATRM), is a corporation created about two weeks after passage of an optional sales tax in a local referendum in 1989 in Leon County. In this referendum, the voters approved a local-option sales tax as the revenue source securing the $60 million bond issue. PATRM's purpose is to scrutinize the workings of Leon County government, including matters associated with the local-option tax and the referendum election. The day of its formation in 1989, PATRM filed suit against the Leon County Canvassing Board seeking an order setting aside the result of the referendum. PATRM alleged that Leon County officials and others had engaged in a variety of improprieties, including the misuse of public funds, employees, and facilities to support passage of the local-option tax, and the use of misleading ballot language. However, the trial court entered a summary judgment against PATRM on grounds it Id. at 33-34. PATRM also filed a suggestion that the judges of the First District should recuse themselves from the case, which was denied. Id. at 32. During the course of the proceedings, PATRM filed a long series of motions and related papers attempting to disqualify judges of the Second Circuit from hearing the trial-level proceedings. These acts culminated in a petition for writ of prohibition filed in the First District. This petition was denied after the First District found the claims legally insufficient. People Against Tax Revenue Mismanagement, Inc. v. Reynolds, 571 So.2d 493 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). [1] When the bond validation proceedings below were commenced, Leon County named PATRM as a defendant. [FN2] In this role, PATRM again raised many of the claims it previously had argued in the earlier proceedings discussed above. These form the central issues in this appeal. Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works http://print.westlaw, com/delivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=A0055800000009680004050042[... 7/29/2003 Page 3 of 7 583 So.2d 1373 16 Fla. L. Weekly S579 (Cite as: 583 So.2d 1373) Page 3 FN2. As P ATRM itself notes, the plaintiffs named PATRM as a defendant because at least some o f the 1 egal claims P ATRM h as raised against the bond issue remained unresolved. Although PATRM's briefs view the plaintiffs' actions in a very sinister light, we see nothing improper with the decision to join PATRM as a defendant. Chapter 75, Florida Statutes, clearly contemplates that a bond validation proceeding is a proper vehicle for quieting all legal and factual issues that may cast doubt on the legal validity of a bond issue. To this end, the statute makes all taxpayers and property owners of the jurisdiction necessary defendants in the bond validation action, including those who happen to be members of political action committees. § 75.02, Fla. Stat. (1989). Nothing in the statutes forbids the county from joining as a defendant any corporation such as PATRM that publicly announces its belief that a bond referendum was unlawfully conducted. PATRM argues t hat t his Court cannot n ow validate the $60 million bond issue '1375 because of "serious questions over the validity of the sales tax election." However, this argument rests on two assumptions not supported by either the law or the record of this case. First, PATRM's brief consistently assumes that a bond validation proceeding is not a proper vehicle for addressing the validity of a bond referendum. For the reasons expressed more fully below, we do not agree with this assumption. Second, while there are many vague allegations of impropriety, we f'md that most are very poorly substantiated in this record. Even in their totality, the facts supporting these allegations clearly are insufficient to require invalidation of the bond issue. [2] The most weighty of PATRM's allegations appears to be the fact that local governmental agencies used public funds and public resources to mount an informational campaign regarding the referendum. In this campaign, the agencies that the optional tax was needed to oblems at the county jail and to meet local infrastructure needs such as the building of new or widened roadways. One county commissioner gave the following statement under cross-examination by PATRM's attorney: There were some critical issues facing this community that needed to be addressed, the community needed to know what those issues were, and it was important that we got that information out to the community and that we made the choices clear to the community. Other witnesses testified that county office equipment was used in this campaign and that many county employees assisted. At the proceeding below, PATRM's counsel argued that such acts were improper because they violated the "neutral forum" of the election. Such a position, however, is tantamount to saying that governmental officials may never use their Ur offices to express an opinion about the best interests of the community simply because the matter is open to debate. A role to that effect would render government feckless. One duty of a democratic government is to lead the people to make informed choices through fair persuasion. We recently saw an example of such persuasion in President Bush's arguments to the American people and his lobbying efforts regarding the war with Iraq. These acts came at a time of intense controversy, when Congress was preparing to take a crucial vote either to support or condemn the use of military force in the Middle East. In much the same se nse, local governments are not bound to keep silent in the face of a controversial vote that will have profound consequences for the~ community. Leaders have both a duty and a right to say which course of action they think best, and to make fair use of their offices for this purpose. [FN3] The people elect governmental leaders precisely for this purpose. While we agree with PATRM that such acts must not be abusive fraudulent, we find nothing in the record to show that the limit was crossed here. FN3. "Fair use," of course, does not imply a right to ignore the requirements of other law, especially Florida's governmental ethics code. Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works http://print.west~aw.c~m/de~ivery.htm~?dest=atp&dataid=A~5 58~~968~4~5~42L. 7/29/2003 Page 4 of 7 583 So.2d 1373 16 Fla. L. Weekly S579 (Cite as: 583 So.2d 1373) Page 4 [3] Similarly, we do not agree that the wording of the ballot language unfairly biased the electorate. According to the documents submitted by P ATRM, the following statement appeared on the ballot: OFFICIAL BALLOT SALES TAX REFERENDUM LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA September 19, 1989 "TAKE CHARGE ... IT'S YOUR FUTURE" (LOCAL GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE SALES TAX) Shall a one-cent local option sales tax for capital improvements be levied in Leon '1376 County for a period of 15 years in order to construct critical capital improvements; specifically: a court-ordered jail, law enforcement capital projects, road and traffic improvements identified in the Tallahassee- Leon County Year 2010 Transportation Plan, and other road and traffic improvements? in existence. Askew, 421 So.2d at 154. Here, we see no similar defect. The ballot language clearly and unambiguously stated that the voters were imposing upon themselves "a one-cent local option sales tax for capital improvements" in Leon County. The campaign slogan appearing on the ballot does no more than urge voters to "take charge ... ifs your future." Some voters might "take charge" by voting yes; others easily might "take charge" by voting no. Thus, this particular language lacks neutrality only implicitly, because it was the campaign slogan of persons favoring the tax. Moreover, identifying capital projects as "critical" in no sense renders this ballot so confusing or imprecise as to be clearly and conclusively defective. It is not reasonable to conclude that the voters of Leon County were so easily beguiled by a few arguably non-neutral words, when the remainder of the ballot plainly stated that a "yes" vote meant new taxes would be imposed. PATRM n ores t hat t he phrase "TAKE CHARGE ... IT'S YOUR FUTURE" was the campaign slogan used by persons who favored the tax. We agree that the use of a campaign slogan and the word "critical" reflect a slight lack of neutrality that should not be encouraged in ballot language. Government should never appear to be "shading" a ballot summary to favor one position or another. However, the fact that some questionable language appears on the ballot is not itself enough to invalidate an entire referendum. Rather, the reviewing court must look to the totality of the ballot language, as such language would be construed b y a reasonable voter. W e h ave h eld that a court may interfere with the right of the people to vote on referendum issues only if the language in the proposal is clearly and conclusively defective. Askew v. Firestone, 421 So.2d 1 51, 1 54 (Fla. 1982). Typically we have overturned an election because of defective ballot language where the proposal itself failed to specify exactly what was being changed, thereby confusing voters. Id.; Wadhams v. Board of County Comm'rs, 567 So.2d 414, 416-17 (Fla. 1990). This especially is true if the ballot language gives the appearance of creating new rights or protections, when the actual effect is to reduce or eliminate rights or protections already We therefore are constrained to approve the trial court's finding that there was nothing in "the referendum election with respect to the sales tax that constituted any breach of public trust nor was any action by those public bodies affirmed by any fraud on the electorate or gross wrongdoing or with any substantial violations of law." PATRM also contends that the trial judge below erred in not joining the Leon County Canvassing Board as a defendant. This argument is wholly without merit. Nothing in the relevant bond validation statutes or the relevant election laws requires the canvassing board to be a party to this proceeding. §§ 75.02, 100.321, Fla. Stat. (1989). Next, PATRM argues that the proceedings below were too summary in nature and failed to meet the requirements of due process. However, the record discloses that PATRM made virtually no argument in the thai court below that the proceedings had deprived it of a meaningful opportunity to participate in the proceedings, present evidence, and make argument. Indeed, when PATRM filed a belated request for continuance, the thai court denied the request in part because PATRM had received almost a month's advance notice. If PATRM legitimately needed more time to prepare Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works http://print.westlaw, com/delivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=A0055800000009680004050042E.. 7/29/2003 Page 5 of 7 583 So.2d 1373 16 Fla. L. Weekly S579 (Cite as: 583 So.2d 1373) P~e5 its argument and evidence, it should have so informed the trial court and placed on the record the specific reasons why the time already given was not sufficient. to secure the bond issue in question. By their own terms, these other statutes grant standing to the county and create the exclusive remedy available to taxpayers in cases of this type. '1377 Here, no such showing was made. The notice and other procedural requirements of sections 75.05 and 75.07, Florida Statutes (1989), were clearly met, as were the requirements of Florida law governing taxpayer challenges to referenda of the type at issue here. § 100.321, Fla. Stat. (1989). The trial court's judgment, which we sustain today, thus is "forever conclusive as to all matters adjudicated against plaintiff and all parties affected thereby." § 75.09, Fla. Stat. (1989). [4] I n i ts next argument, PATRM contends t hat the only proper method of resolving the election dispute in this instance was the procedure estabhshed by section 102.168, Florida Statutes (1989). This statute requires the county canvassing board to be the named defendant in taxpayer lawsuits challenging elections. Thus, PATRM argues that Leon County lacks standing to litigate the merit's of PATRM's challenge to the referendum election. [FN4] FN4. Obviously, the doctdne of res judicata applies to the extent that PATRM is attempting to argue that the canvassing board is a proper opposing party. This issue was resolved against PATRM in an unappealed opinion of the First District. People Against Tax Revenue Mismanagement, Inc. v. Leon County Canvassing Bd., 573 So.2d 31 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). However, PATRM now argues the somewhat different issue that the county lacks standing in the present case because of section 102.168, Florida Statutes (1989). We therefore proceed to the merits of the issue. This argument is wholly meritless. Section 102.168 on its face is a general statute creating a procedure by which taxpayers (as plaintiffs) may challenge a disputed referendum by suing canvassing boards. Other more specific statutes, [FN5] however, address the question of bond validation proceedings and referenda in which voters have approved a tax FN5. A specific statute always prevails over a general statute to the extent of any irremediable inconsistency. Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1959). In effect, the former is construed as an exception to the latter. Under section 75.02, the county (as a plaintiff) has express standing to litigate "its authority to incur bonded debt or issue certificates of debt and the legality of all proceedings in connection therewith, including assessment of taxes levied or to be levied. "§ 75.02, Fla. Stat. (1989) (emphasis added). The validity of a bond referendum is an issue inseparable from the validity of the tax assessment itself. Thus, chapter 75 is a proper vehicle for the issues presented in this case. More to the point, section 100.321 clearly provides the exclusive remedies available to anyone wishing to challenge a referendum of the type at issue here. Under this statute, a taxpayer may file an action in the circuit court of the county where the vote was held, within sixty days after the posting of election results. The only necessapy defendants are any county commission or municipal government that authorized the referendum, not the canvassing board. § 100.321, Fla. Stat. (1989). Thus, PATRM's argument that it was required to sue the canvassing board is not well taken. Moreover, the statute plainly states that the opportunity for taxpayers to file a lawsuit challenging the referendum is closed as soon as a bond validation proceeding is filed in the same matter: In the event proceedings shall be filed in any court to validate the bonds, which have been voted for, then any such taxpayer shall be bound to intervene in such validation suit and contest the validity of the holding of the referendum or the declaration of the results thereof, in which event the exclusive jurisdiction t o determine t he 1 egality of such referendum or the declaration of the results thereof shall be vested in the court hearing Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works http://print.west~aw.c~m/de~ivery.htm~?dest=atp&dataid=A~~558~~~~~~~968~~~4~5~~42E.. 7/29/2003 583 So.2d 1373 16 Fla. L. Weekly S579 (Cite as: 583 So.2d 1373) and determining said validation proceedings .... [T]he judgment in said validation proceedings shall be fmal and conclusive as to the legality and validity of the re ferendum and of the d eclarafion of the results thereof, and no separate suit to test the same shall be thereafter permissible. '1378 § 100.321, Fla. Stat. (1989) (emphasis added). It could not be plainer that the county had standing to bring this suit, that the court below had exclusive jurisdiction over questions regarding the referendum, and that PATRM's sole remedy was to intervene in the validation proceeding once it had commenced. Even if PATRM had continued its earlier lawsuit against the city and county, the court hearing that suit would have been required to dismiss the action as soon as the validation complaint was filed; and PATRM then could have continued its separate legal challenge only by intervening in the validation proceedings. Id. Once the plaintiffs joined PATRM or any other taxpayer as a defendant, [FN6] that taxpayer was under an obligation to advance all objections to the validity of the referendum in the proceeding below or be forever barred from raising them again. Id. FN6. Section 100.321 does not foreclose the possibility of the plaintiff joining specific taxpayers as defendants. It merely specifies that the taxpayers' sole remedy is to intervene in the validation proceeding once it has commenced. § 100.321, Fla. Stat. (1989). Next, PATRM argues that the public notice for the bond validation was inadequate because it failed to tell the public that "any issues over the validity of the sales tax election remained outstanding." We find this argument utterly without merit. Leon County clearly complied with the bond validation and election statutes. Next, PATRM raises a variety of issues regarding the propriety of the referendum election, some of which partially duplicate its earlier arguments. However, the new allegations of impropriety raised by PATRM either are trivial or have absolutely no beating on the overall validity of the referendum. Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Page 6 of 7 Page 6 Nor can we agree that any sort of "cumulative error" occurred that would invalidate the referendum vote. As its fmal issue, PATRM argues that the trial judge should have disqualified himself from hearing this case because of alleged bias. We fred PATRM's argument without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the court below validating a $60 million bond issue for improvements in Leon County is affu'med in all respects. We specifically affirm the trial court's conclusion that the bond issue is for a proper and lawful purpose fully authorized by law. The building of a jail, the construction and renovation of roads, and the financing of infrastructure clearly are valid public purposes justifying the issuance of these bonds. It is so ordered. ON DENIAL OF REHEARING In its petition for rehearing, PATRM calls to this court's attention the technical fact that its members had organized themselves as a political action committee prior to the referendum, and only as a corporation afterward. We have corrected the opinion to reflect this fact. Obviously, this factual error in no sense changes the result of the opinion above. [5] PATRM also argues on reheating that the referendum w as not a "bond referendum" within the meaning of section 100.321, Florida Statutes (1989). It is mae that the Leon County referendum was organized under authority of section 212.055(2), Florida Statutes (1989). However, there is no question that the purpose of this referendum was t o approve o r disapprove a source of funds to secure a bond issue. Whenever this is the case, section 100.321 applies. Finally, we are mindful o f PATRM's argument that its members have been "singled out" as defendants, unlike other taxpayers. Clearly, local government cannot engage in such practices if the purpose is merely to harass or "punish" a particular taxpayer or group of taxpayers. In such instances, the trial court on a proper motion should impose appropriate sanctions on the local government. However, we Orig. U.S. Govt. Works http://print.west~aw.c~m/de~ivery.htm~?dest=atp&dataid=A~~558~~~~~~~968~~~4~5~~42L. 7/29/2003 583 So.2d 1373 16 Fla. L. Weekly S579 (Cite as: 583 So.2d 1373) fred no such purpose here. PATRM itself was the one that initiated the complicated series of lawsuits and court petitions described above. Whenever a party initiates litigation, that party assumes the risks associated with that decision. [6] '1379 Finally, PATRM argues that the "petition for ancillary relief' it filed with this Court constitutes an attempt to seek review of the two earlier district court opinions (described above) involving the issues of this case. Any such "petition for ancillary relief'--even if it were authorized by the roles of procedure--is not a proper vehicle for appealing a lower court decision. Even a cursory review of the roles shows this to be the case. Counsel's argument on this point is utterly without merit. B y choosing not t o appeal the lower court opinions in the proper manner, counsel has bound his client to the full legal effect of those opinions, under the doctrine of res judicata. Petition for reheating is denied. The petition for ancillary relief is unauthorized by the roles of court, is a nullity, and thus is stricken from this record. It is so ordered. Page 7 of 7 Page 7 SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, BARKETT, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur. 583 So.2d 1373, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S579 END OF DOCUMENT Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works http://print.west~aw.~~m/de~ivery.htm~?dest=-atp&dataid=A~~558~~~~~~~968~~~4~5~~42[... 7/29/2003 Page 1 of 8 540 So.2d 147 14 Fla. L. Weekly 610 (Cite as: 540 So.2d 147) P~el District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District. not inherently ambiguous and properly described justifications for adoption of proposal. West's F.S.A. § 101.161(1). PALM BEACH COUNTY and Jackie Winchester, Supervisor of Elections of Palm Beach County, Appellants, V. George L. HUDSPETH, Jr., John O. Farsons, Mary L. Reilly, George Dunton, William Laminsky, Sarah Laminsky, Sol Silverman, Jean Hammer, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 323 and Palm Beach County AFL- CIO, et al., Appellees. No. 88-2910. [2] Counties 104k55 Most Cited Cases Ballot summary proposing unified health care district in county did not violate Florida Election Code, which requires that summary be printed in "clear and unambiguous language," by using the term "consolidation," even though as to a portion of county's residents, proposal would really "create" a taxing district; use o fterm did not, in and o fitself, justify setting election aside, nor did it fatally infect election when coupled with alleged errors of omission. West's F.S.A. § 101.161(1). March 8, 1989. Clarification Denied April 19, 1989. [3] Municipal Corporations 268k860 Most Cited Cases Opponents brought suit challenging placement on ballot of referendum proposing unified health care district in county. The Circuit Court, Palm Beach County, Richard B. B urk, J., enjoined placement o f question on ballot, but then stayed injunction, and opponents appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Hersey, C.J., held that: (1) ballot summary did not violate requirement of Florida Election Code that summary be printed in "clear and unambiguous language," and (2) while a county not only may but should allocate tax dollars to educate the electorate on purpose and essential ramifications of referendum items, it must do so fairly and impartially. Reversed and remanded. West Headnotes [1] Counties C=*55 104k55 Most Cited Cases Language of ballot summary proposing uniform health care district in county did not violate requirement o f Florida Election C ode t hat summary be printed in "clear and unambiguous language"; while summary spoke of the "effective delivery of quality health care services," the terms "effective delivery" and "quality health care services" were No Florida cases or legislative acts specifically or by necessary implication prohibit expenditure of public funds for any lawful purpose found by unit of local government to be in public interest, provided that govermnent otherwise has power or authority to act in matter under consideration. I4] Counties 104k55 Most Cited Cases While county not only may but should allocate tax dollars to educate the electorate on purpose and essential ramifications of referendum items, it must do so fairly and impartially. '148 Glen J. Torcivia, West Palm Beach, for appellants. Richard A. Sicking of Kaplan, Sicking & Bloom, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellees. Adrian Winterfield of Adrian Winterfield, P.A., Palm Beach, appellee, pro se. Carl V.M. Coif'm, West Palm Beach, for amicus curiae, City of West Palm Beach. Thomas A. Sheehan, III of Moyle, Flanigan, Katz, Fitzgerald & Sheehan, P.A., West Palm Beach, for amicus curiae, Citizens for Better Health Care, Inc. James R. Wolf, Gen. Counsel, Florida League of Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works h // nm westlaw corn/dehve htmPdest a &datald A005 ttp: p' . . ' ry. . =tp '= 5800000010880004050042[... 7/29/2003 Page 2 of 8 540 So.2d 147 14 Fla. L. Weekly 610 (Cite as: 540 So.2d 147) Page 2 Cities, Inc., Tallahassee, Paul J. Nicoletti, Gen. Counsel, Palm Beach County Mun. League, Inc., West Palm Beach, and William J. Roberts, Gen. Counsel, Florida Ass'n of Counties, Inc., for amicus curiae, Florida League of Cities, Inc., and Palm Beach County Mun. League, Inc. James K. Green of Green, Eisenberg and Cohen, West Palm Beach, for amicus curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Inc., Palm Beach Chapter. HERSEY, Chief Judge. The controversies which we address in this appeal involve the validity of county action in obtaining voter approval of an independent special taxing district to provide health care and the propriety of expenditures made by the county in promoting passage of the Health Care Act. This effort to create a county-wi& health care district began in 1987. At that time there were in existence three separate independent health care districts located in various parts of the county and the central and northeastern portions of the county constituted a dependent health care district. Each independent district was authorized to and did collect a special tax to raise money to pay for the distribution of health care services within each particular district. These taxes were in addition to the county's ten mill tax (which is the maximum millage that a county is permitted by law to impose). During the same period, the county utilized a portion of its tax collections to provide health care services so that the residents within independent districts were being taxed twice for health care services. plan to meet objections which had been voiced by opponents of the unified health care district. '149 The legislature then adopted Chapter 88-460, Laws of Florida, which generally followed its predecessor except t hat t he millage c ap imposed o n the district was reduced from three to two mills and the governing body was expanded to provide for more equitable representation. As a result of the foregoing, the Palm Beach County Commission caused the following ballot question to be placed on the November 8, 1988, ballot: PALM BEACH COUNTY HEALTH CARE ACT Shall the Palm Beach County Health Care District be established to plan, fund and coordinate the effective delivery of quality health care services, including trauma care, indigent medical care, home health care, emergency, and other medical services through consolidation of districts into one comprehensive system and be authorized to levy annually an ad valorem tax not to exceed 2 mills for cost effective health care services for the people of Palm Beach County? Yes No In addition, the county authorized the expenditure of funds, not to exceed $50,000, to promote the passage of the Health Care Act, and county employees, as part of their official duties, were encouraged to accept speaking engagements to promote passage of the Act. Appellees then sought an injunction to remove the Health Care District question from the ballot and to prevent the county from expending funds to promote it. Chapter 87-450, Laws of Florida, provided for the creation of a unified health care district encompassing all of Palm Beach County. The technical method employed to create the district was to expand the boundaries of one of the districts to include the e nfire county a nd to abolish a 11 other health care districts. The county referendum, required by the statute, was defeated at the polls in March of 1988. Subsequently, various changes were made in the After notice and heating, an order was entered requiting that the question be removed from the ballot and prohibiting the county from distributing materials to promote passage of the Act. The former constituted a mandatory injunction and the latter a traditional "restraining order" or injunction. This court stayed the injunction so that the question remained on the ballot and the Health Care Act was approved by a majority of the voters on November 8, 1988. Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works http://print.westlaw.com/delivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=A0055800000010880004050042[... 7/29/2003 Page 3 of 8 540 So.2d 147 14 Fla. L. Weekly 610 (Cite as: 540 So.2d 147) Page 3 Thus, while the correctness of the lower tfibunal's "Temporary Restraining Order" or more correctly, temporary injunction, is technically moot since the events and activities which it encompassed are history, we have elected to retain jurisdiction in order to address the question of whether passage of the Health Care Act was tainted by the ballot language or by inappropriate expenditures made to advocate its passage. On the first question, there is a considerable body of law to assist this court, if only by analogy and deduction, in determining whether the ballot language is legally sufficient. The same cannot be said of the question of the propriety of expending taxpayers' money to promote (or to oppose) the passage of particular legislation. On this question, there is a paucity of precedent in this or any other jurisdiction. THE BALLOT LANGUAGE The preliminary test which a ballot summary must meet is established by the Florida Election Code, section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (1987), which provides in pertinent part: Whenever a constitutional amendment or other public measure is submitted to the vote of the people, the substance of such amendment or other public measure shall be printed in clear and unambiguous language on the ballot after the list of candidates .... The substance of the amendment or other public measure shall be an explanatory statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief purpose of the measure. Thus, the requirements are that the summary consist of an explanation of the "chief purpose" of the particular legislation and that the language be "clear and unambiguous." [1] Opponents of the Health Care Act, represented by appellees, contend that the summary in question violates these requirements in several respects. The ballot summary speaks of the "effective delivery of quality health care services." Appellees object to the use of "buzz words" such as these, alleging that they '150 are ambiguous, are designed to promote rather than to inform and do not describe the substance of the proposal. The trial court rejected appellees' position, pointing out that the underlying legislation utilized similar terminology. The terms "effective delivery" and "quality health care services" are not inherently ambiguous. As used in the summary, they rather obviously impart a comparative flavor to the provision in which they are contained. Thus, the import of the provision is that the unification of health care districts will permit more effective delivery of services than is possible without such unification. It further indicates that health care services will be of higher quality because of, or as a result of, unification. These are both justifications for adoption of the Act and explanatory of its chief purpose. The trial court correctly rejected appellees' contrary position. [2] Another argument posed by opponents of the Act is that the summary is fatally flawed because of the misleading effect of use of the term "consolidation." The substance of this argument is that voters in that portion of the county not presently within the boundaries of one of the three independent health care districts would be misled because, as to them, the Act really "created" a taxing district rather than "consolidated" taxing districts. In other words, the Act imposed upon citizens outside o f t he existing independent districts a health care tax for the first time, whereas the ballot summary could be construed as exempting them from the new district and any such tax, if it did in fact only "consolidate" existing districts. Other than on a purely semantic level, which we will b riefty treat, t he harm that accmes from t his i s identical, or nearly so, to the consequences which appellees describe in an entirely separate and distinct argument based upon other perceived inadequacies in the ballot summary language. Because they are related in a cause and effect sense and thus, in our view, constitute but two sides of the same equation, we will consider them together. There is something to be said for the proposition that use of the term "consolidfite" is inherently misleading if in fact it is required to convey the meaning "create" to some but not all o fits readers. While the distinction is semantic, the impact of a "new" as opposed to a "different" tax is real rather than technical. Like everyone else in Palm Beach County, taxpayers outside of the boundaries of the three existing independent health care districts pay a certain amount which will be devoted to providing Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works http://print.westlaw, com/delivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=A0055800000010880004050042[... 7/29/2003 Page 4 of 8 540 So.2d 147 14 Fla. L. Weekly 610 (Cite as: 540 So.2d 147) health care services. Unlike those within the districts, however, they do not pay a separate and additional amount imposed by a health care district. Under the Act, they will do so for the first time. The question is whether this is made sufficiently clear by the language chosen. Does use of the term "consolidate" make it less than clear? Does the paucity of explanatory language as to the make-up and powers of the governing body add to the confusion to the extent that the Act must be struck down as parading under false colors? While not controlling, w e h old that u se o f the term "consolidate" rather than "create" would not, in and of itself, justify setting the election aside. It was, in fact, a technically correct use of that term because that portion of the county not included within one of the three independent health care (taxing) districts was properly referred to as a dependent district. The summary refers to establishing a unified Health Care District "through consolidation of districts into one comprehensive system" which, as we have pointed out, was technically correct. The more important question is whether use of the term "consolidate" coupled with alleged errors of omission--what the summary does not say--fatally infects the election. Our supreme court, in Hill v. Milander, 72 So.2d 796, 798 (Fla. 1954), explained that" [w]hat the law requires is that the ballot be fair and advise the voter sufficiently to enable him intelligently to cast his ballot." There are two perspectives from which the summary of any proposition to be placed on the ballot may be viewed and each has both '151 negative and positive elements. The summary must not have a tendency to mislead the voters, whether by what it says or by what it fails to say. The second perspective from which ballot summary language i s t o b e viewed concerns i ts informational content, i.e., whether the summary gives the voter fair notice of the main purpose of the legislation so that the voter knows what decision is being made. Askew v. Firestone, 421 So.2d 151 (Fla. 1982), provides an example of a ballot summary deemed to be misleading. The summary in that case reads: "Prohibits former legislators and statewide elected officers from representing other persons or entities for compensation before any state government body for a period of 2 years following vacation of office, Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Page 4 unless they file full and public disclosure of their financial interests." Id. at 153. This language, taken alone and out of context, is not necessarily deceptive. However, there was already in place an absolute prohibition against former legislators and statewide elected officers appearing before state agencies for two years following vacation of office. Thus the proposed amendment liberalized this provision while apparently imposing an impediment to such appearances (filing of a fmancial disclosure). The Askew court struck the provision from the ballot as "misleading to the public concerning material changes to an existing constitutional provision...." 421 So.2d at 156. The chief purpose of the act as portrayed by the summary language was to limit appearances before state agencies by former state employees. The actual purpose was to eliminate the prohibition against such appearances. The same cannot be said of the ballot summary of the Health Care Act. The "chief purpose" of the Act was to create a county-wide health care district. The perceived tendencies to mislead involve questions concerning the impact of the special tax and the authority and nature of the governing body. These peripheral issues, while of legitimate concern, do not have a direct beating on the main purpose of the Act, although they are essential to the implementation of that purpose. As our supreme court pointed out in Carroll v. Firestone, 497 So.2d 1204 (Fla. 1986), it is not necessary to explain every ramification of proposed legislation, only the chief or main purpose. This holding pertains as well to the argument that a fourth special health care district must be created before it can be "consolidated" with the three existing districts. Technical shortcomings of such mechanical details simply do not rise to the level of "clear and conclusive defects" required to invalidate '/ an election. Several of the cases relied on by appellees can be readily distinguished on that basis. For example, in Kobrin v. Leahy, 528 So.2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 523 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1988), the voters were asked to eliminate a particular board in the same election at which they were electing persons to serve on that board. The ballot summary referred neither to elimination of the board nor to the apparent inconsistency in the two courses of Orig. U.S. Govt. Works http://print.westlaw.com/delivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=A0055800000010880004050042[... 7/29/2003 Page 5 of 8 540 So.2d 147 14 Fla. L. Weekly 610 (Cite as: 540 So.2d 147) action which the election forced voters to take. No such intemal inconsistency was foisted upon the voters by the Health Care Act. Pointing out that many details of a proposed plan were not explained on the ballot, the supreme court nonetheless held a ballot summary adequate in Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 394 So.2d 981 (Fla. 1981). The court noted that it was common knowledge that details regarding any proposed referendum are grist for the media's mill for months in advance of an election. Thus it was "idle to argue" that every proposal on a ballot must appear at great and undue length. Id. at 987. The ballot summary is limited to seventy-five words. The raison d'etre of the summary is to give _ the voter an accurate picture of the main purpose off the proposed legislation. As population grows and technology advances, the complexity of problems with which government must cope increases proportionately. The sheer scope of a particular legislative solution to a modem problem may therefore relegate all but the most crucial and skeletal elements of '152 the legislation to the realm of voter self-education. That education must necessarily be found outside the voter's booth and preferably well in advance of the election. The b allot summary involved h ere does not explain the nature and extent of authority of the governing body, does not tell voters in the northeast corridor that they will be subjected for the first time to an assessment of two mills as health care district taxes which will be in excess of the ten mill limitation imposed upon counties, whether the district is dependent or independent, or whether it is authorized to issue certain bonds. The length of the preceding paragraph mentioning just a few of the details omitted from the ballot summary is exactly seventy-five words. Can it seriously be contended that a ballot surunmry not only must explicate the main purpose of proposed legislation, but also must furnish various details that are of particular interest to one or more groups of voters? We answer this question in the negative and find no constitutional infumity in the ballot summary of the Health Care Act. EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS Copt. © West 2003 No Claim to Page 5 [3] As noted earlier, the Palm Beach County Commission approved the expenditure of $50,000 to promote passage of the Health Care Act. The issue is the propriety of the expenditure of public funds for the purpose of supporting (or opposing) political issues. Appellants (the county and the elections supervisor) look for authority to section 125.01, Florida Statutes (1987), which sets forth the general powers of county government. Section 125.01(1)(w) allows the county to "[p]erform any other acts not inconsistent with law, which acts are in the common interest of the people of the county, and exercise all powers and privileges not specifically prohibited by law." Section 125.01 (3)(b) provides for 1 iberal construction o f t he section "to secure for the counties the broad exercise of home role powers authorized by the State Constitution." In Speer v. Olson, 367 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1978), the supreme court held that section 125.01(1) gives to a county's governing body the power to carry on county government. The court stated that unless the legislature has preempted a particular subject by general or special law, the county has full authority to act in exercise of home mle power. Accordingly, the court found that the county had the power to issue a category of general obligation bonds. Appellants' position that the county has the authority to expend public funds to promote the passage of an ordinance deemed by it to be in the public interest £mds support in a line of Attorney General opinions. Opinions of the Attorney General are considered persuasive, but do not constitute binding authority on the courts of Florida. Beverly v. Division of Beverage of the Department of Business Regulation, 282 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). In 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 074-113, (April 10, 1974), the Attorney General concluded that a municipality may spend municipal funds to purchase newspaper advertisements supporting or opposing the repeal of a county utilities tax. In 1978 op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 078-41, (March 9, 1978), the decision was that municipal funds may be expended to support a bond issue to raise funds to acquire and develop parks and recreation areas. In 1984 Orig. U.S. Govt. Works http://print.westlaw, com/delivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=A0055800000010880004050042[... 7/29/2003 Page 6 of 8 540 So.2d 147 14 Fla. L. Weekly 610 (Cite as: 540 So.2d 147) Page 6 Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 084-17, (Febmary 9, 1 984), the Attorney General concluded that members of the state House of Representatives are not barred by law from speaking against a proposed amendment to the state constitution, and that if the legislature deemed expenditure of public funds to support or oppose adoption of an amendment or to disseminate information about it to be in the public interest, then the legislature could authorize such expenditures, provided they are authorized by law or resolution, made pursuant to a budget, or otherwise appropriate. In 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 086-87, (October 7, 1986), the Attorney General said that unless restricted by, and to the extent consistent with, general or special law, the Brevard County Commission may expend public funds to advertiseJ its position in an upcoming referendum, provided that prior to making such an expenditure, '153 the Brevard County Commission makes appropriate legislative findings as to the purpose of the expenditure and the benefits which would accrue to the county therefrom. These Attorney General opinions emphasize, and we echo, that there are no Florida cases or legislative acts that either specifically or by necessary implication prohibit the expenditure of public funds for any lawful purpose found by a unit of local government to be in the public interest, provided that government otherwise has the power or authority to act in the matter under consideration. It follows that questioned expenditures must be tested on a case-by-case basis; the inquiry is one for the judicial branch, and the issue t o be resolved is whether the particular expenditure offends the Constitution of the State of Florida, laws of the State of Florida, or fundamental concepts of justice and fair play. Article I, section 1, of the Florida Constitution provides that political power is inherent in the people and that this power is not to be denied or impaired b y t he e nunciafion o f a ny other rights. T o the extent, then, that a proposed expenditure of public funds infringes upon or tends to infringe upon the political power reserved to the people, that expenditure will be deemedconstitutionally impermissible. Finding little guidance in Florida law for the application of this standard, we mm to foreign experience for enlightenment. In the case of Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Board of Education of Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp., 13 N.J. 172, 98 A.2d 673 (1953), the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a suit for declaratory judgment. At issue was whether a school bond election was invalid and whether use of public fimds to advocate a favorable vote on the bond issue was illegal. Writing for the court was Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., (later Supreme Court Justice) who said that the expenditures for booklets promoting passage of the issue were illegal and beyond the board's powers, but that the issue was moot because the election had already passed. In that case, the parties conceded at oral argument that the actions under attack, if improper, would not suffice to invalidate the election already held, and that therefore the issue was moot. 98 A.2d at 676. Apparently, a refund or repayment was not sought in that action. Nevertheless, the court found the issue important enough to comment as follows: IT]he board made use of public funds to advocate one side only of the controversial question without affording the dissenters the opportunity by means of that financed medium to present their side, and thus imperilled the propriety of the entire expenditure. The public funds entrusted to the board belong equally to the proponents and opponents of the proposition, and the use of the funds to fmance not the presentation of facts merely but also arguments to persuade the voters that only one side has merit, gives the dissenters just cause for complaint. 98 A.2d at 677. The opinion also referred to the seminal California case dealing with expenditures of public funds on ballot measures, Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 257 P. 530 (1927), overruled in part on other grounds, Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal.3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal.Rptr. 697 (1976). In that case, the court found that the use of public fimds to further a bond issue was illegal unless the power to do so had been given to the governmental agency expending the funds in clear, unequivocal language. The court found that such power had not been given to the board. It must be conceded that the electors of said city opposing said bond issue had an equal right to and interest in the funds in said power fund as those who favored said bonds. To use said public funds to advocate the adoption of a proposition which was opposed by a large Copt. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works http://print.westlaw, com/delivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=A0055800000010880004050042[... 7/29/2003 Page 7 of 8 540 So.2d 147 14 Fla. L. Weekly 610 (Cite as: 540 So.2d 147) Page 7 number of said electors would be manifestly unfair and unjust to the rights of said last-named electors, and the action of the board of public service commissioners in so doing cannot be sustained, unless the '154 power to do so is given to said board in clear and unmistakable language. 257 P. at 537. In Stanson v. Mort, the Supreme Court of California held that the Department of Parks and Recreation had authority t o disseminate information about a bond election, b ut could not expend public funds to promote the issue, notwithstanding legislative approval of placing the bond act on the ballot. The court said that executive officials were not free to spend public funds for any "public purpose" they may choose, but must utilize appropriated fimds in accordance with the legislatively designated purpose. That case involved funds appropriated for specified purposes, which did not provide for campaign expenses. Although this approach is more restrictive than required in the present case, Stanson contains general language which we consider pertinent: A fundamental precept o f this nation's democratic electoral process is that the government may not 'take sides' in election contests or bestow an unfair advantage on one of several competing factions. A principal danger feared by our country's founders lay in the possibility that the holders of govemmental authority would use official power improperly to perpetuate themselves, or their allies, in office; the selective use of public funds in election campaigns, of course, raises the specter of just such an improper distortion of the democratic electoral process. 130 Cal. Rptr. at 705, 551 P.2d at 9 (citations omitted). A m ore recent California case i s League of Women Voters of California v. Countywide Criminal ,Justice Coordination Committee, 203 Cal. App.3d 529, 250 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1988). The California appellate court held that the use of public funds to formulate and draft a proposed initiative to reform the criminal justice system and to identify proposed sponsors was not an improper expenditure since it did not a mount to a partisan campaign activity. See also Stern v. Kramarsky, 84 Misc.2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 CN.Y.Sup. Ct. 1975). [4] The theme which predominates in these cases, and one which is reinforced by logic and cormnon notions of fair play, is simply stated. While the county not only may b ut should allocate t ax dollars to educate the electorate on the purpose and essential ramifications of referendum items, it must do so fairly and impartially. Expenditures for that purpose may properly be found to be in the public interest. It is never in the public interest, however, to pick up the gauntlet and enter the fray. The funds collected from taxpayers theoretically belong to proponents and opponents of county action alike. To favor one side of any such issue by expending funds obtained from those who do not favor that issue tums government on its head and is the antithesis of the democratic process. In order to create a special taxing district, government must permit the people to be heard and, in fact, to make the ultimate decision at the ballot box. If government, with its relatively vast financial resources, access to the media and technical know-how, undertakes a campaign to favor or oppose a measure placed on the ballot, then by so doing government undercuts the very fabric which the constitution weaves to prevent government from stifling the voice of the people. An election which takes place in the shadow of omniscient government is a mockery--an exercise in futility--and therefor a sham. The appropriate function o f govemment i n connection with a n issue placed before the electorate is to enlighten, NOT to proselytize. We do not mean to imply that Palm Beach County undertook any such blitzkrieg. We address the issue of law only, and not the facts. We therefore make no attempt to pass judgment on each expenditure in question here, nor was the trial court given the oppommity to do so. However, appellees seek to recover for such expenditures as may be found to have been improper. We remand for further appropriate proceedings o n this issue should appellees care to pursue it. Finally, on appeal, appellees challenge the validity of the special act which provided for the creation of a unified health care '155 district. We do not treat this issue or the other issues raised by appellees for the first time in this appellate proceeding. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works http://print.westlaw.com/delivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=A0055800000010880004050042[... 7/29/2003 · Page 8 of 8 540 So.2d 147 14 Fla. L. Weekly 610 (Cite as: 540 So.2d 147) DELL and GUNTHER, JJ., concur. 540 So.2d 147, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 610 END OF DOCUMENT Page 8 Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works http://print.westlaw.com/delivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=A0055800000010880004050042L. 7/29/2003 May29,2003 MayOr Jeff Perlman City of Delray Beach 100 Northwest First Avenue Delray Beach, Florida 33444 Dear Mayor Perlman: As a supporter of the Florida Trust, I would like to thank you for your commitment to Florida's preservation community. From your recent involvement in the Trust and it's programs, I know that you are very dedicated to the cause of preserving Florida's rich heritage. It is for this reason that I would like to invite you to further your partnership with the Florida Trust by becoming a Grand Sponsor for our 2004 Annual Statewide Conference to be held in Delray Beach, May 13 - 16, 2004. The local committee has started working on the schedule for this important statewide event for several months now, and the draft brochure will be ready late this fall. The sessions that will be offered cover a wide range of topics including adaptive reuse, maritime heritage, and economic benefits, and the tours planned for this year's event include National Register buildings not generally open to the public, private homes in Delray Beach's historic neighborhoods, and beautiful gardens. The special events this year will take conference attendees into many of the local treasures in your areas as well. There are many benefits to the City of Delray Beach in becoming a Grand Sponsor for this premier event. In remm for your donation, you could receive: recognition in the initial Annual Conference Brochure (if received before January 15, 2004, readership of 5,000) and the final conference brochure, signage in the registration area of the conference, and your organization's brochures in conference packets. Also, your organization could be listed in the July/August 2004 issue of The Florida Preservationist (readership of 2,000). A list of the Grand Sponsorship Benefits is attached for your review. I hope that you will give thiS request yOur favorable consideration and complete the enclosed Sponsorship Form and return to the Florida Trust Office. The Trust is very proud to have served Florida for the past twenty-five years, and we look forward to partnering with you for this important statewide event. Sincerely, Caroline Tharpe Interim Executive Director FLORIDA TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION,' 1NC. Post Office Box 11206, Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3206 1114B Thomasville Road, Tal[ahassee, Florida 32303 · Telephone: 850-224-8128 · FAX: 850-224-8159 information~qloridatrust.org www. floridatrust.org ll ]l II IG1 lira ILmmnlu ii uunanE~UIILm)~I MEMORANDUM TO: Delores R_angel FROM: Caroline Tharpe, Interim Executive Director~~' DATE: June 5, 2003 RE: City of Delray Beach Sponsorship for 2004 Florida Trust Annual Conference ************************************************************************************* Per your request, I have attached a full sponsorship packet for the City of Delmy Beach for our upcoming 2004 Annual Conference to be held in Delray Beach, May 13-16, 2004. I have attached brochures and information on some of our past conferences for your information. Please contact me at (850) 224-8128 if you have any questions or concerns. Thank you. FLORIDA TRUST FoR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, INC. Post Office Box 11206, Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3206 1114B Thomasville Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32303 · Telephone: 850-224-8128 * FAX: 850-224-8159 information@floridatrust.org www. floridatmst.org Annual Conference Sponsorship OPportunities Grand SponsOr $10,000 Sponsor acknowledgment in the Florida Trust's The Florida Preservationist, distributed statewide (3, 000 readership bimonthly). Sponsor acknowledgrnem in the Florida Trust Annual Conference brochure, distributed nationally and smtewide (5, 000 readership). Sponsor acknowledgment in the Florida Trust Annual Conference on-site brochure, distributed to all conference attendees. Sponsor information inserted in the Florida Trust Annual ConferenCe packets, distributed to all conference attendees. Sponsor acknowledgment on publicity provided at the Florida Trust Annual Conference. Invitation to the Florida Trust President's Reception. Four complimentary Full Conference Registrations to the Florida Trust Annual Conference. Ten complimentary tickets to the Florida Trust Final Gala on Saturday. All contributions are tax deductible as allowable by law. Documentation of the sponsor's gift will be provided by the Florida Trust for Historic Preservation, a nonprofit corporation with 501 (c)(3) tax-stares. Other sponsorship benefits can be negotiated with the Florida Trust for Historic Preservation. For more information or to confunn sponsorship, please contact Caroline Tharpe, Interim Executive Director in the Tallahassee Office, (850) 224-8128, or by email, caroline~floridatmst.org. FLORIDA TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, INC. Post Office Box 11206, Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3206 1 l14B Thomasville Road, Ta[lahassee, Florida 32303 * Telephone: 850-224-8128 · FAX: 850-224-8159 information@floridatrust.org www. floridatrust.org Gold Sponsor $5,000 Sponsor acknowledgment in the Florida Trust's The Florida Preservationist, distributed statewide (3,000 readership bimonthly). Sponsor acknowledgment in the Florida Trust Annual Conference brochure, distributed nationally and statewide (5, 000 readership). Sponsor acknowledgment in the Florida Trust Annual Conference on-site brochure, distributed to all conference attendees. SponsOr information inserted in the Florida Trust Annual Conference packets, distributed to all conference attendees. Sponsor acknowledgment on publicity provided at the Florida Trust Annual Conference. Invitation to the Florida Trust President's Reception. Two complimentary Full Conference Registrations to the Florida Trust Annual Conference. Six complimentary tickets to the Florida Trust Final Gala. All contributions are tax deductible as allowable by law. Documentation of the sponsor's gift will be provided by the Florida Trust for Historic Preservation, a nonprofit corporation with 501(c)(3) tax-status. O~her sponsorship benefits can be negotiated with the Florida Trust for Historic Preservation. For more information or to confirm sponsorship, please contact Caroline Tharpe, Interim Executive Director in the Tallahassee Office, (850) 224-8128, or by email, caroline~floridatmst.org. FLORIDA TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, INC. Post Office Box 11206, Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3206 1114B Thomasville Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32303 * Telephone: 850-224-8128 · FAX: 850-224-8159 information@floridatrust.org www. floridatrust.org Silver Sponsor $1,000 - 2,500 X X X Sponsor acknowledgment in the Florida Trust's The Florida Preservationist, distributed s~atewide (3, 000 readership bimonthly). Sponsor acknowledgment in the Florida Trust Annual Conference brochure, distributed nationally and statewide (5, 000 readership). Sponsor acknowledgment in the Florida Trust Annual Conference on-site brochure, distributed to all conference attendees. Sponsor information inserted in the Florida Trust Annual Conference packets, distributed to all conference attendees. Sponsor acknowledgment on publicity provided at the Florida Trust Annual Conference. Invitation to the Florida Trust President's Reception. One complimentary Full Conference Registration to the Florida Trust Annual Conference. Four complimentary tickets to the Florida TruSt Final Gala. All contributions are tax deductible as allowable by law. Documentation of the sponsor's gift will be provided by the Florida Trust for Historic Preservation, a nonprofit corporation with 501(c)(3) tax-status. Other sponsorship benefits can be negotiated with the Florida Trust for Historic Preservation. For more information or to confirm sponsorship, please contact Caroline Tharpe, Interim Executive Director in the Tallahassee Office, (850) 224-8128, or by email, caroline~floridatrust.org. FLORIDA TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, INC. Post Office Box 11206, Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3206 111413 Thomasville Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32303 "Telephone: 850-224-8128 · FAX: 850-224-8159 information~floridatrust .org www. floridarrust.org Bronze SponSOr $500 Sponsor acknowledgment in the Florida Trust Annual Conference brochure, distributed nationally and statewide (5, 000 readership). Sponsor acknowledgment in the Florida Trust Annual Conference on-site brochure, distributed to all conference attendees. Sponsor information inserted in the FlOrida Trust Annual Conference packets, distributed to all conference attendees. Sponsor acknowledgmem on publicity provided at the Florida Trust Annual Conference. Two complimentary tickets to the Florida Trust Final Gala. All contributions are tax deductible as allowable by law. Documentation of the sponsor's gift will be provided by the Florida Trust for Historic Preservation, a nonprofit corporation with 501 (c)(3) m-status. Other sponsorship benefits can be negotiated with the Florida Trust for Historic Preservation. For more information or to confirm sponsorship, please contact Caroline Tharpe, Interim Executive Director in the Tallahassee Office, (850) 224-8128, or by email, caroline@floridatmst.org. FLORIDA TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, INC. Post Office Box 11206, Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3206 1114B Thomasville Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32303 · Telephone: 850-224-8128 · FAX: 850-224-8159 information@floridatrust.org www. floridatmst.org General Underwriter $250 Sponsor acknowledgment in the Florida Trust Annual Conference brochure, distributed nationally and statewide (5, 000 readership). Sponsor acknowledgment in the Florida Trust Annual Conference on-site brochure, distributed to all conference attendees. Sponsor information inserted in the Florida Trust Annual Conference packets, distributed to all conference attendees. Sponsor acknowledgment on publicity provided at the Florida Trust Annual Conference. All contributions are tax deductible as allowable by law. Documentation of the sponsor's gift will be provided by the Florida Trust for Historic Preservation, a nonprofit corporation with 501 (c)(3) tax-status. Other sponsorship benefits can be negotiated with the Florida Trust for Historic Preservation. For more information or to confirm sponsorship, please contact Caroline Tharpe, Interim Executive Director in the Tallahassee Office, (850) 224-8128, or by email, caroline~floridatmst.org. FLORIDA TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, l~qc. Post Office Box 11206, Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3206 1114B Thomasville Road, Ta/lahassee, Florida 32303 * Telephone: 850-224-8128 · FAX: 850-224-8159 information@floridatrust.org www. floridatrust.org